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Non-technical Summary 
The objective of this study is the economic analysis of the Decarbonisation Roadmap 2050, recently 
published by the EU Commission. The Decarbonisation Roadmap is the latest strategy to make the 
decarbonisation of the EU reality. It aims at a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of more than 
80% in 2050 vis-à-vis 1990 and an expansion of renewable energies to 50% or more in electricity 
generation in 2050. Since there is a lack in detailed economic analysis of this latest EU climate 
strategy so far, our study aims at shedding more light on it at the sectoral and the macro level. 
Compared to the EU Roadmap simulations, we examine especially welfare effects, carbon leakage 
and terms of trade on the macro level, and output, investment, emissions and competitiveness on 
the sectoral level. 
For this purpose, our study significantly extends the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model 
PACE (Policy Analysis based on Computable Equilibrium) developed at ZEW Mannheim: The model 
combines an extended sectoral disaggregation (beyond GTAP 7, Global Trade Analysis Project) with a 
bottom-up representation of technologies for electricity generation. It represents current EU climate 
policies as well as Copenhagen Pledges for 2020 in a new reference scenario and extends the time 
horizon of the model from 2020 to 2050. The recursive-dynamic model is recalibrated in dynamic 
terms using data from the European Commission and the U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
We study one Reference scenario and six policy scenarios implementing the Roadmap emissions 
targets (Fragmented Action; Fragmented Action with sustained free allocation of allowances; 
Fragmented Action with extended future use of the Clean Development Mechanism, CDM; Global 
Action, Global Action with equalisation of the CO2 price within the EU; Global Action with global 
equalisation of the CO2 price) and discuss and compare the results. Herein, we contribute to the 
literature on EU climate policy analyses with the help of CGE models and to the literature of long-
term integrated assessment studies as well. 
The simulation of the Fragmented Action scenario yields the following key results: The costs for the 
EU-27 induced by the Decarbonisation Roadmap could stay below 0.3% until 2020 and below 2% 
until 2035 in terms of consumption losses (or welfare effects). They might increase to 3% thereafter 
and possibly increase significantly in later periods in the absence of breakthrough technologies. The 
international carbon leakage rate might reach up to 20%, presumably mainly through the fossil fuel 
price channel.  Moreover, the changes in the output value of industry sectors could substantially 
differ in a range of around +1% to -15% in the 2040s. 
The simulations of the other policy scenarios show that an extensive future use of CDM would have 
strong positive welfare effects on the EU and could widely disburden the EU from the additional 
costs of the Decarbonisation Roadmap. (Herein, we understand CDM in the sense of ‘where’-
flexibility, this means the reduction of emissions where it is cheapest, such as in developing 
countries, not in the sense of a project-based mechanism associated with technology transfer.) CDM 
would not solve the global climate problem, though. A sustained allocation of free allowances 
(benchmarking) to leakage sectors, on the contrary, would slightly increase overall costs. Global 
climate action would improve the terms of trade in favour of the EU. Without international emissions 
trading, it would have limited positive welfare effects on the EU, though. However, the equalisation 
of the CO2 price across EU ETS and non-ETS sectors would significantly reduce the mitigation costs 
(under global action). Additionally allowing for international emissions trading (under global action) 
might disburden the EU from the additional costs of the Roadmap until 2040; and in the 2040s the 
mitigation costs for the EU could fall to less than 1.5%. 
At the sectoral level, CDM could increase the output of all EU sectors compared to pure fragmented 
action, sustained free allocation of allowances could increase the output of most ETS sectors, and 
global climate action without international emissions trading would have diverse sectoral effects. 
When the carbon price were equalised across sectors and across regions via international emissions 
trading, global climate action would benefit most EU sectors. Climate policy induced changes in 
investment, emissions and competitiveness could have even more diverse sectoral patterns than the 
output effects under the different climate policy scenarios mentioned above.  
We also discuss a number of uncertainties and limitations that numerical economic analyses in 
general face. Some of the most important uncertainties are future economic growth (against the 
backdrop of the current economic turbulences in the EU and the USA and political upheavals in 
middle-East and North African countries), technical progress (in general and regarding energy 
efficiency and energy generation technologies in particular) and elasticities of substitution and price 
elasticities (that govern, for example, the possibility to replace fossil fuel inputs in production and in 
electricity generation). These uncertainties strongly increase when extending the time horizon of the 
analysis. In this sense, our estimations for the final periods with high emissions cuts are subject to 
the highest uncertainties. 
We conclude that the successful implementation of the EU Decarbonisation Roadmap probably 
requires a wise and joint consideration of technology, policy design and sectoral aspects. These three 
aspects are closely interlinked. For example, technological solutions are necessary to achieve 
ambitious emissions targets at acceptable costs from a global perspective. An appropriate climate 
policy design is necessary to transfer the benefits from climate policy to the EU macro level and 
further to the sectoral level. Sector- or firm-specific strategies in correspondence with macro policies 
can be helpful for avoiding structural and technological lock-in effects and reducing costs in energy-
intensive sectors. However, the avoidance of severe climate change damages requires global action. 
In this sense, as a feasible option, climate policy could make use of CDM in (smaller) countries that 
are not part of the climate coalition, while the main emitters were within the climate coalition; and 
climate policy would make use of international emissions trading as well as emissions trading across 
all sectors within the EU and elsewhere to avoid the additional costs of the EU Decarbonisation 
Roadmap to a large extent. 
  
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Das Ziel dieser Studie besteht in der ökonomischen Analyse der Dekarbonisierungsstratie 2050 
(„Roadmap for moving to a low-carbon economy in 2050“) hinsichtlich ihrer Auswirkungen auf die 
europäische Union (EU-27) – auf der makro- und mikroökonomischen Ebene. Das zugrunde liegende 
Strategiepapier wurde in 2011 von der EU-Kommission veröffentlicht. Es strebt eine Reduktion der 
Treibhausgasemissionen von mehr als 80% in 2050 gegenüber 1990 sowie eine Ausdehnung des 
Anteils erneuerbarer Energien in der Elektrizitätsgewinnung auf 50% oder mehr in 2050 an. 
Verglichen zum Strategiepapier der EU Kommission untersuchen wir unter Anderem 
Wohlfahrtseffekte, Carbon Leakage (Emissionsanstieg im Ausland durch Emissionsvermeidung in der 
EU) und Veränderungen der Terms of Trade (Handelsbedingungen) auf der Makroebene sowie 
Produktion, Investitionen, Emissionen und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit auf der Sektorebene. 
Zu diesem Zweck erweitern wir in dieser Studie das Allgemeine Gleichgewichtsmodell (Computable 
General Equilibrium, CGE, Model) PACE (Policy Analysis based on Computable Equilibrium), das am 
ZEW Mannheim entwickelt und vielfach erfolgreich eingesetzt wurde. Die verwendete Modellversion 
verbindet eine hohe sektorale Auflösung (besser als GTAP 7, Global Trade Analysis Project) mit einer 
technologiebasierten Darstellung des Elektrizitätssektors. Der Zeithorizont des Modells wurde für 
diese Studie von 2020 auf 2050 erweitert. Die bestehende EU-Klimapolitik bis 2020 und die 
Kopenhagenziele für 2020 sind dabei im Referenzszenario implementiert. Wir untersuchen in 
unseren Modellsimulationen sechs Politikszenarien, welche die Dekarbonisierungsstragie umsetzen, 
mit dem Referenzszenario. 
Die Simulation des Szenarios mit fragmentierter Klimapolitik (‚EU-Alleingang') liefert die folgenden 
Ergebnisse: Die Kosten der Dekarbonisierungsstrategie für die EU-27 können bis 2020 unter 0.3% und 
bis 2035 unter 2% des Konsumwerts liegen. Sie könnten danach auf 3% steigen und gegen 2050 
weiter ansteigen, falls keine bahnbrechenden Technologien zum Einsatz kommen. Die Rate des 
internationalen Carbon Leakage beträgt circa 20%. Dies wird hauptsächlich dadurch verursacht, dass 
der Ölpreis aufgrund der EU-Klimapolitik sinkt, so dass andernorts mehr Öl verbraucht wird. Des 
Weiteren unterscheiden sich die Produktionseinbußen der EU-Industriesektoren deutlich (-15% bis 
+1% in 2040).  
Die Simulationen der anderen Szenarien zeigen auf der Makroebene, dass sich eine weitreichende 
zukünftige Nutzung des CDM (Clean Development Mechanism) klar positiv auf die EU auswirkt und 
die zusätzlichen Kosten der Dekarbonisierungsstrategie sogar wettgemacht werden könnten. 
Allerdings löst CDM nicht das Klimaproblem, da lediglich die Emissionsvermeidungen dorthin 
verlagert werden, wo sie billiger zu erreichen sind. Eine über 2027 hinausgehende freie Vergabe von 
Emissionsrechten an bestimmte energieintensive EU-Produzenten würde dagegen die 
gesamtwirtschaftlichen Kosten leicht erhöhen. Globale Klimapolitik würde die Terms of Trade für die 
EU verbessern. Ohne internationalen Emissionshandel wäre die Kostenreduktion für die EU jedoch 
gering. Die Erweiterung des Emissionshandels auf alle EU-Sektoren sowie die Einführung von 
internationalem Emissionshandel führen im Rahmen der globalen Klimapolitik zu deutlichen 
Kostenreduktionen. Erst gegen 2050 würde der internationale CO2-Preis durch die weltweiten 
ambitionierten Klimaziele ansteigen, so dass die EU nicht mehr die zusätzlichen Kosten der 
Dekarbonisierungsstrategie durch den Zukauf billiger Zertifikate vermeiden kann.  
Auf sektoraler Ebene würde CDM allen EU-Sektoren zugutekommen. Die freie Vergabe von 
Emissionsrechten über 2027 hinaus käme den meisten Sektoren im EU-Emissionshandelssystem 
zugute. Globale Klimapolitik ohne internationalen Emissionshandel würde sich jedoch unterschiedlich 
auf die EU-Sektoren auswirken. Die Angleichung des CO2-Preises über alle Sektoren und Länder käme 
den meisten EU-Sektoren zugute. Die durch die Dekarbonisierungsstrategie hervorgerufenen 
Veränderungen von Investitionen, Emissionen und der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit würden sich noch 
stärker zwischen den EU-Sektoren unterscheiden als die Produktionsveränderungen.  
Wir schlussfolgern, dass eine erfolgreiche Umsetzung der Dekarbonisierungsstrategie bis 2050 eine 
geschickte, gemeinsame Berücksichtigung von Technologieoptionen (Energieeffizienz und 
Dekarbonisierung), Politikdesign und sektoralen Charakteristika erfordert. Dabei spielt das 
Politikdesign (das heißt die Art und Weise, wie ein bestimmtes Klimaziel umgesetzt wird) eine 
entscheidende Rolle dafür, dass Kostenersparnisse auf EU-Ebene und weiter auf sektoraler Ebene 
verwirklicht werden können. Da die sektoralen Effekte stark unterschiedlich ausfallen, erscheint es 
sinnvoll, stärker als bisher über sektorale Auswirkungen von Klimapolitik und sektorale Maßnahmen 
zu deren Umsetzung nachzudenken. Globale Klimaschutzmaßnahmen erscheinen letztendlich 
notwendig, um ambitionierte Klimaziele zu erreichen. CDM könnte darüber hinaus  im Hinblick auf 
(kleinere) Länder, die nicht offiziell an der globalen Klimapolitik teilnehmen, zu Kostenreduktionen 
führen. 
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Abstract: 
 
We carry out a detailed CGE (Computable General Equilibrium) analysis of the EU Decarbonisation 
Roadmap 2050 on a macroeconomic and on a sectoral level. Herein, we study a Reference scenario 
that implements existing EU policies as well as 3 unilateral and 3 global climate action scenarios. We 
identify global climate action with international emissions trading and the ful l equalization of CO2 
prices across all (EU) sectors as a reasonable policy option to avoid additional costs of the 
Decarbonisation Roadmap to a large extent. This policy option may include CDM (Clean Development 
Mechanism in the sense of ‘where’-flexibility) in an extended form if there are countries without 
emissions caps. Moreover, we identify diverse sectoral effects in terms of output, investment, 
emissions and international competitiveness. We conclude that the successful realization of the EU 
Decarbonisation Roadmap probably requires a wise and joint consideration of technology, policy 
design and sectoral aspects.  
 
 
Keywords: EU, Decarbonisation Roadmap, Copenhagen Pledges, post Kyoto, energy-intensive 
sectors, competitiveness, leakage 
JEL Classifications: C68, F18, Q43, Q54 
Highlights: 
• We extend the CGE model PACE until 2050 and include energy technologies. 
• We assess the newest EU Decarbonisation Roadmap in six policy scenarios. 
• Global action with ETS, and CDM from non-participants, create low(est) costs. 
• Mitigation costs can strongly increase at CO2 reductions around 80%. 
• The policy effects vary strongly across EU sectors. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In 2011 the European Commission presented the ‘Roadmap for moving to a low-carbon economy in 
2050’ (EU, 2011). This Roadmap aims at a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in the EU-27 by at 
least 80% in 2050 vis-à-vis emissions in 1990. Such an effort appears necessary in order to avoid a 
temperature increase of more than 2°C which would create severe climate change hazards. Such an 
emissions reduction requires the restructuring of the energy system: The share of renewable 
energies in EU electricity generation is expected to rise from about 15% in 2005 to 50% or more in 
2050. Renewable energies plus nuclear power and fossil-based energies in combination with carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) might even cover almost 100% of electricity generation in 2050 (EU, 2011). 
Our study is to our knowledge the first research article on the EU Decarbonisation Roadmap. 
It is the policy contribution of this study to assess the sectoral effects and the overall costs of 
decarbonisation given certain policy scenarios. In this respect, this study contributes to the academic 
literature on EU policy modelling (such as Klepper and Peterson, 2006; Böhringer et al., 2009) by 
studying the most recent EU climate policy proposal based on an established state-of-the-art CGE 
(Computable General Equilibrium) model. Herein, this study makes significant technical 
contributions: First, it provides a high sectoral disaggregation beyond GTAP (Global Trade Analysis 
Project). This allows us to identify detailed sectoral results that are crucial for the actual 
implementation of emissions reductions on the industry level. – Many macroeconomic studies, CGE 
and in particular Integrated Assessment studies with a focus on modelling energy technologies, 
abstain from modelling sectoral effects. And the original publication by the EU Commission (EU 2011) 
provides only some selected sectoral results. – Second, we combine the high sectoral resolution with 
a simplified bottom-up representation of energy sources. This allows us to include renewable targets, 
the (restricted) use of nuclear power and the reduction of fossil fuel use in electricity generation. The 
explicit inclusion of renewable energies is important for implementing the 20-20-20 targets as well as 
the EU Decarbonisation Roadmap 2050 that include an expansion of renewables explicitly. The 
expansion of renewables can help reduce mitigation costs and is for instance a pillar of the German 
plan for restructuring the energy system. – Most CGE models abstract from a bottom-up approach. – 
Third, it extends the time horizon of the PACE model from 2020 to 2050 and calibrates a new 
reference scenario that includes existing EU policies. The extension to 2050 is necessary for the 
analysis of the EU Roadmap reaching an 80% reduction in 2050. – Most EU climate policy studies 
have so far examined the year 2020 which is the target year of the EU 20-20-20 policy. In other 
words, the new ‘EU Roadmap to a Low Carbon Economy’ has extended the time horizon of ‘official’ 
policy targets applicable to numerical analysis to 2050. – Due to these contributions, our paper refers 
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to the Integrated Assessment literature of long-term analyses including different energy technologies 
(such as the ADAM project, Edenhofer et al., 2010; Leimbach et al., 2010). – Fourth, it focusses on 
the comparison of different policy designs implementing the same emissions targets. It reveals 
significant differences in the economic outcomes between the different designs. – The original EU 
Roadmap 2050 (EU 2011) publication examines different technological and Fragmented versus 
Global Action assumptions but it does not contrast the various sub-scenarios (extended free 
allocation of allowances, extended CDM, national or international emissions trading) that we 
examine. – Against this backdrop, our quantitative results are supposed to be novel and relevant for 
decision makers in policy and industry as well as for the public.  
The newest climate policy developments during and after the COP17 in Durban question the 
decarbonisation path until 2020 to some extent since countries like the USA and Canada are 
reluctant to agree on or to keep binding targets. Nonetheless, Durban has given new hope that a 
global long-term decarbonisation strategy starting in 2020 will be realized. Such a long-term strategy 
is the focus of our policy assessment. Durban has also confirmed that the EU is going to stay a front-
runner in climate policy and that the Copenhagen Pledges for 2020 will hold. Accordingly, we take 
both aspects into account in our assessment. 
2. Model 
 
The quantitative assessment of the EU Decarbonisation Roadmap is carried out with PACE, a multi-
sector, multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of global production, consumption, 
trade and energy use. PACE is established in economic research and policy consulting. The following 
description provides a model overview. A technical description of the CGE model structure is 
provided by Böhringer and Lange (2005). A recent description including the bottom-up 
representation of the energy system is provided by Böhringer et al. (2009); for further details see 
Böhringer and Löschel (2006) and Böhringer and Rutherford (2008). 
 
2.1. Methodology 
 
PACE (Policy Analysis based on Computable Equilibrium) is implemented in MPSGE (Mathematical 
Programming System for General Equilibrium Analysis; Rutherford, 1999), a subsystem of GAMS 
(General Algebraic Modeling System; Brooke et al. 2010), using PATH (Dirkse and Ferris 1995) for 
solving the MCP (mixed complementarity problem).  
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The model runs until 2050 in five-year steps. (We will only report the results for 2010, 2020, 
… in order to reduce the amount of reported data. The results for 2015, 2025, … are available upon 
request.) It is recursive dynamic, this means it solves for a sequence of market equilibria. These 
equilibria are endogenously connected via investment. Investment in one period increases the 
capital stock of the next period. However, capital accumulation is not due to inter-temporal 
optimization. Capital accumulation follows the Solow-Swan model: The representative consumer 
saves a certain fraction of income. All savings are invested so that they augment the capital stock 
which is available in the next period. The resulting capital accumulation is a driver of economic 
growth besides population growth and technical progress which are both exogenous. In the Business 
as Usual scenario without climate policy, each period is calibrated to external data that includes 
technical progress and population growth. While capital accumulation is determined by the Business 
as Usual calibration, it reacts to policy shocks together with production and consumption. One can 
expect that the introduction of climate policy reduces production and investment and thus the 
growth path.  
The model consists of a set of numerous equations (in-equalities) that describe the world 
economy. For each period, there exists a set of prices and quantities that solves the equations. Two 
classes of conditions characterize the perfectly competitive equilibrium of a general equilibrium 
model like PACE: zero-profit conditions and market clearing conditions. The validity of these 
conditions follows directly from the assumptions of profit maximization of firms, utility maximization 
of consumers, constant returns to scale in production, and homotheticity of consumer preferences. 
The latter class of conditions determines the price of each output good as the unit cost to produce 
this good. This cost equals the marginal cost as well as the average cost of production. The key model 
equations are described in Appendix M. 
Each region consists of a microeconomic consumer and a microeconomic producer for each 
production sector. The consumer chooses a bundle of consumption goods that maximizes her utility 
given her preferences and her budget. The budget is determined by her income received from selling 
the primary production factors (labour, capital and fossil-fuels) that she owns. We also assume that 
each region can obtain a certain amount of emission permits in each period. Final demand of the 
representative consumer is modelled as a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) composite good 
which combines an energy aggregate with a non-energy aggregate (analogue to the production 
structure described below). Substitution patterns within the non-energy aggregate are reflected by a 
Cobb-Douglas function. The energy aggregate consists of several energy goods combined with a 
constant elasticity of substitution. 
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The producer chooses a bundle of production goods that maximizes his profits given his set of 
production possibilities. The production possibilities are determined by his technology, which 
efficiently transfers a certain amount of input goods and production factors into a certain amount of 
one output good. Herein, the production factors capital and labour are perfectly mobile across 
sectors within regions while the production factor natural resources is sector-specific. Land is 
attributed to the production factor capital. The main production function has the following principal 
CES structure – illustrated in Figure M1 in Appendix M – in each sector: At the top level, non-energy 
inputs are employed with an aggregate of energy, capital and labour. At the second level, a CES 
function describes the substitution possibilities between the energy aggregate and the aggregate of 
labour and capital. At the third level, capital and labour are combined with a constant elasticity of 
substitution. Moreover, at the third level, the energy aggregate consists of electricity and a fossil fuel 
input. The latter input is further split into coal, gas and oil associated with different elasticities of 
substitution and with emission permits in fixed proportions (in the presence of a carbon pricing 
scheme). The CES specification allows producers to substitute fossil fuel inputs by other inputs as a 
reaction to an increasing carbon price. The extent of substitution, however, is limited by the choice 
of the cost minimizing input bundle given the elasticities of substitution. Moreover, each good used 
in intermediate and final demand corresponds to a CES aggregate of a domestically produced variety 
and a CES import aggregate of the same variety imported from the other regions (Armington, 1969). 
The model does not impose a restriction on the trade balance, this means trade surpluses or deficits 
can change over time or between policy scenarios without economic repercussions.  
The tax system includes all types of taxes (production taxes or subsidies, intermediate good 
taxes, input factor taxes, consumption taxes as well as tariffs). The government collects tax revenues 
and redistributes them to the representative consumer in a lump-sum way. The use of fossil energy 
in production requires producers to pay for the released carbon corresponding to the physical carbon 
content of each fossil fuel input in the presence of a carbon pricing scheme and of auctioning 
allowances. In case of free allocation of allowances (for example in combination with a benchmarking 
scheme), producers have to pay in the same way in the first step. In the second step, producers 
receive a subsidy which compensates them for the bill paid in the first step (compare Jensen and 
Rasmussen, 2000; Edwards and Hutton, 2001). As a result of this subsidy, the producer expands 
output which raises the demand for fossil and other inputs. This can in turn drive up the carbon price. 
The model allows for free trading of allowances without transaction costs across sectors within the 
EU emissions trading scheme (ETS). The other sectors need to reduce emissions, too, so that the total 
emissions target of the EU is kept. This is achieved via another emissions trading mechanism in the 
model, and via a carbon tax in reality. 
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Importantly, the model does not take any costs due to climate damages into account. Such 
costs would include reduced productivity due to yield losses in agriculture, due to heat stress and 
diseases of workers, for instance. They would also include destruction of capital due to flooding at 
coasts and large rivers, due to storms and avalanches, and other disasters.  The avoidance of these 
costs of climate change creates a benefit that is not captured in the model. Therefore, in our scenario 
analysis, different policy scenarios will result in different global emissions and thus regional climate 
damages, which are not included our numerical policy valuation. 
2.2. Data 
 
The base year data for 2004 are taken from the GTAP 7 data base (Global Trade Analysis 
Project; Badri and Walmsley, 2008). Data for the future economic development until 2050 are taken 
from IEO (2008/2010). IEO (2008/2010) provides very detailed regional data on total and fuel-specific 
primary energy consumption and carbon emissions given assumptions on the development of GDP, 
fossil fuel prices and other factors. The data take population growth and technical progress into 
account.1  
Substitution elasticities in international trade (so-called Armington elasticities) are based on 
empirical estimates reported in the GTAP database. The values of sectoral Armington elasticities are 
reported in Table M1 in Appendix M. Certain CES elasticities of substitution between production 
factors (capital, labour, energy inputs, non-energy inputs) are taken from Okagawa and Ban (2008) 
based on recent sectoral panel data estimates for the period 1995 to 2004.2 The values of the sector 
dependent elasticities corresponding to the production structure in Figure M1 are also reported in 
Table M1. A higher elasticity number denotes a better possibility to substitute inputs for each other 
due to price changes. An elasticity number of zero denotes a Leontief relationship without 
substitution possibilities; this means all inputs are used in fixed proportions. 
 
2.3. Aggregation 
 
The model version applied here partitions the world into 13 regions: 
                                                          
1 Technical progress involves crucial uncertainties in all existing numerical models. 
2 Negative estimates in the original dataset are replaced. – Despite using such estimates, the choice of 
elasticities – such as the elasticities of substitution in the production function and the elasticities of electricity 
supply for different energy sources – involves crucial uncertainties in all existing numerical models. 
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 EUR European Union 27 
 USA United States of America 
 CAN Canada 
 MEX Mexico 
 ANZ Australia and New Zealand 
 BRA Brazil 
 RUS Russia 
 CHN  China 
 IND India 
 JPN Japan 
 SIM South Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia 
 RAX Rest of Annex-I (Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, Ukraine, Belarus etc.) 
 ROW Rest of the World (mainly developing countries) 
It distinguishes 24 production sectors that include seven disaggregated energy intensive sectors (FER, 
ORG, INO, CEM, BRT, ISP and ALU)3 beyond the sectors in the GTAP 7 data base as an extended 
feature based on Löschel et al. (2009): 
 CRU Crude oil 
 OIL Refined oil and coal products 
 GAS Natural gas 
 COL Coal  
 MIN Mining and construction 
 FAW Food, agriculture and wood  
 PPP Paper, pulp and printing 
 FER Fertilizers  
 ORG Organic chemicals 
 INO Inorganic chemicals 
 OCR Other chemicals  
 CEM Cement 
 BRT Bricks and tiles 
 ISM Manufacturing of iron and steel 
 ISP Further processing of iron and steel 
 ALU Aluminium 
 ONF Other non-ferrous metals 
 ONM Other non-metallic minerals 
 MCH Machinery and other manufacturing 
 ELE Electricity and heat 
 TRN Transport 
 TWL Textiles, wearing, apparel and leather  
 SER Services 
 CGD Investment good composite 
The additional energy intensive sectors are added to the GTAP 7 database by means of the Splitcom 
routines (Horridge, 2005). Based on additionally collected data from diverse sources (Eurostat, 20094;  
                                                          
3 ONF, ONM, ISM and PPP are other energy intensive sectors. 
4 Eurostat Structural Business Statistics (SBS) for production values and purchases of energy products, and 
Eurostat External Trade for import and export values. 
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UN, 2009a, b), Splitcom disaggregates all relevant values of the underlying GTAP 7 database – such as 
production, trade, primary and intermediate inputs and final use – at the sectoral level for all model 
regions and balances the extended GTAP 7 database with the newly added sectors. The sector split is 
performed by using information on the relative size of the disaggregated sectors in production, 
international trade, energy consumption (electricity and fuel use) and final consumption. It is a 
particular problem of the simultaneous application of the data sources for the sectoral 
disaggregation that these databases are built upon alternative industrial classification systems. 
Hence, the sectoral disaggregation is carried out by establishing a concordance scheme linking the 
GTAP 7 sectors and the sectors in the respective classification schemes. Based on these additional 
data, the production shares, the energy consumption shares as well as the export and import shares 
are calculated for all relevant subsectors and sectors for all model regions. For the EU-27, all required 
data are available. Production and trade data are also available for almost all model regions outside 
the EU-27. For other (small) non-EU regions for which there are no data available, the respective 
sectoral structure is estimated in a reasonable way based on geographic proximity. 
As another advanced feature beyond GTAP 7, the model distinguishes five energy sources 
(energy technologies) for electricity generation in the EU, based on Böhringer and Rutherford (2008): 
 COL Coal    31  
 GAS Natural gas   20 
 OIL Refined oil and coal5     3 
 NUC Nuclear   31 
 REN Renewable energies  15 
The numbers indicate the percentage shares in total electricity generation for the benchmark year 
2004/2005 in the EU-27 in accordance with EU (2007). Renewables encompass those energies that 
were in use in 2005 such as solar-thermal, photovoltaic, biomass – given the state of technology in 
this year. This means, our model does not take technological progress and breakthrough 
technologies into account. The energy sources are associated with a fixed factor via a certain 
elasticity of substitution which rises from 0.1 in 2005 to one in 2050. This represents an increasing 
possibility of expanding energy technologies in the long-run while there are stronger limitations in 
the short-run. Energy technologies are represented by Leontief production functions that can be 
active or inactive depending on their profitability. Each technology uses general and electricity-
specific intermediate inputs and, if necessary, fossil fuels as inputs and produces electricity as the 
output. Herein, the inputs create costs as in any other sectoral production function. And every 
energy technology is calibrated to benchmark year data like other sectoral production functions. As a 
                                                          
5 Rarely used for electricity generation. 
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result, we gain an endogenous development of the energy mix over time. Herein, nuclear power is an 
exception since the elasticity is reduced so that the output of nuclear power (in absolute numbers) 
rises only by 20% between 2005 and 2045. Alternatively, target shares of energy technologies, e.g. in 
form of ‘green quotas’ can be set. 
3. Scenarios 
 
This section describes the new, detailed scenarios (also see Table S1): (1) The calibration of the new 
Reference scenario that implements current policies, and the design of the policy scenarios based on 
EU (2009a, 2011): (2) Fragmented Action, i.e. bilateral ambitious EU climate policy efforts, (3) 
Fragmented Action Free, i.e. the extended free allocation of allowances to EU ETS sectors, (4) 
Fragmented Action CDM, i.e. the extended future use of the Clean Development Mechanism, (5) 
Global Action, i.e. global ambitious climate action, (6) Global Action National, i.e. the equalization of 
CO2 prices across EU ETS and non-ETS sectors, and (7) Global Action International, i.e. the 
equalization of CO2 price across all regions and all sectors.  
Emissions targets and other economic indicators as summarized in Table 1 are given by EU 
(2011) for each time period. They stem from other exemplary (cost minimizing) scenario simulations 
and do not represent optimal time paths in the sense of (socially) optimal growth. Monetary values 
are always expressed in € (2005-Euros). The choice of our policy scenarios under scrutiny has two 
reasons:  
First, the three main scenario categories, Reference, Fragmented Action, and Global Action, 
follow the scenario setup in EU (2011). The distinction between Fragmented and Global Action is in 
particular relevant because currently the EU is a front runner in climate policy and it is sometimes 
argued that such a ‘fragmented’ approach does not have any significant impact on global warming. 
We ought to strive for a ‘global’ approach instead. Others argue that giving a good example and 
being a technological leader in ‘green’ technologies is nonetheless desirable or inevitable. Although 
the latter two aspects cannot be captured in our model, it appears helpful for providing policy advice 
to compare ‘fragmented’ and ‘global’ policies with regard to their economic impacts.   
 Second, from an economic perspective, it appears insightful to quantify the expected 
efficiency gains stemming from a Clean Development Mechanism and emissions trading across all EU 
sectors and across countries world-wide. Moreover, from an energy-intensive industry perspective, it 
appears interesting to quantify the effects of an extended free allocation of allowances. The 
following tables for the different scenarios will be explained in the subsequent subsections. 
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Emissions 
target (2020) 
2050 vis-à-vis 
1990 [%] 
Policy characteristics in the EU-27 Policy characteristics abroad 
        
1 Reference (-21) -40 Currently implemented & 
agreed policies 
Copenhagen Pledges  
for 2020 & kept constant 
thereafter 
2 Fragmented 
Action 
(-25) -80 EU Roadmap Copenhagen Pledges as 
above 
3 Fragmented 
Action Free 
(-25) -80 EU Roadmap with extended 
allocation of free allowances 
Copenhagen Pledges as 
above 
4 Fragmented 
Action CDM 
(-25) -80 EU Roadmap with extended & 
optimistic CDM use 
Copenhagen Pledges as 
above 
5 Global Action  (-25) -80 EU Roadmap Copenh. Pled. intensified 
for all regions & up to 
80% by 2050 in Annex-I 
6 Global Action 
National 
(-25) -80 EU Roadmap & equalization of 
CO2 prices ETS & non-ETS 
Copenhagen Pledges 
intensified as above 
7 Global Action 
International 
(-25) -80 EU Roadmap & full inter-
national emissions trading 
Copenhagen Pledges 
intensified as above 
 
Table S1: Overview of policy scenarios 
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World 
GDP 
growth 
rate [%] 
EU GDP 
growth 
rate [%] 
EU coal 
consum. 
[Mtoe] 
EU gas 
consum. 
[Mtoe] 
EU oil 
consum. 
[Mtoe] 
EU elec. 
gener. 
[TWh] 
EU ener-
gy per 
GDP int. 
[toe/M€] 
World 
rel. oil 
price 
[%] 
EU rel. 
electr. 
price  [%] 
  en./cal. en./cal. en./cal. en./cal. en./cal. en./cal. end. en./cal. end. 
2005 1.3 0.5 302 355 734 3033 157 100 100 
2010 2.8 2.2 275 384 671 2993 123 127 109 
2020 2.5 2.1 215 339 650 3194 90 142 108 
2030 2.1 1.7 196 367 548 3559 68 175 108 
2040 2.0 1.5 148 330 519 3529 52 195 108 
2050     124 308 507 3517 42 212 118 
          
  
EU 
renew. 
share in 
elec. [%] 
World 
CO2 em. 
vs. 1990 
[%] 
EU 
CO2 em. 
vs. 1990 
[%] 
EU ETS 
share in 
emis. 
[%] 
EU CO2 
per GDP 
intens. 
[g/€] 
EU CO2 
per GDP 
growth  
rate[%] 
EU ETS 
CO2 
price 
[€/t] 
EU 
terms of 
trade [% 
BAU2005] 
EU 
welfare 
(consum.) 
[% BAU] 
  en./cal. end. exog. exog. en./cal. end. end. end. end. 
2005 15 27 -7 56 371 -1.6 5 100.3 -0.72 
2010 18 27 -12 53 342 -2.8 9 99.9 -0.26 
2020 25 44 -21 53 247 -2.3 32 100.3 -0.82 
2030 28 63 -28 55 184 -3.0 33 100.3 -1.53 
2040 32 79 -36 50 139 -2.1 51 100.4 -1.42 
2050 36 97 -40 45 113   60 100.6 -1.08 
 
Table 1: Macroeconomic indicators of the Reference scenario6 
 
 
 
  
World 
CO2 em.  
[% ‘90] 
CO2 
emis.  
[% ‘90] 
CO2/GDP 
intensity 
[g/€] 
Renew. 
share in 
ele. [%] 
Rel. ele. 
price    
[%] 
ETS CO2 
price   
[€/t] 
Leakage 
rate [% 
REF] 
Terms o. 
trade [% 
BAU05] 
Welfare 
change 
[% REF] 
                    
2005 27 -7 371 15 100 5 0.0 100.3 0.00 
2010 27 -12 342 18 105 9 0.0 99.9 0.00 
2020 43 -25 235 26 120 38 17.8 100.4 -0.30 
2030 61 -40 154 31 126 50 19.9 100.6 -1.24 
2040 75 -62 84 40 147 94 19.2 101.2 -3.29 
2050 90 -80 39 51 158 144 19.6 102.1 -5.98 
 
Table 2: Macroeconomic indicators for the EU-27 under the Fragmented Action scenario 
 
 
                                                          
6 The results for the years 2015, 2025, 2035 and 2045 are available for all scenarios upon request. 
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World 
CO2 em. 
[% ‘90] 
CO2 
emis. 
 [% ‘90] 
CO2/GDP 
intensity 
[g/€] 
Renew. 
share in 
ele. [%] 
Rel. ele. 
price    
[%] 
ETS CO2 
price   
[€/t] 
Leakage 
rate [% 
REF] 
Term. of 
trade [% 
BAU05] 
Welfare 
change 
[% REF] 
                    
2005 27 -7 371 15 100 5 0.0 100.3 0.00 
2010 27 -12 342 18 105 9 0.0 99.9 0.00 
2020 43 -25 235 24 120 38 17.8 100.4 -0.30 
2030 61 -40 154 29 130 60 17.3 100.4 -1.28 
2040 75 -62 84 35 155 111 16.6 100.9 -3.50 
2050 90 -80 39 43 167 192 16.0 101.4 -6.55 
 
Table 3: Macroeconomic indicators for the EU-27 under the Fragmented Action Free scenario 
 
 
  
World 
CO2 em. 
[% ‘90] 
Rel. CO2 
emissions 
[% ‘90] 
CO2/GDP 
intensity 
[g/€] 
Renew. 
share in 
ele. [%] 
Rel. ele. 
price  
[%] 
ETS CO2 
price 
[€/t] 
Leakage 
rate [% 
REF] 
Term. of 
trade [% 
BAU2005] 
Welfare 
change 
[%] 
  
 
                
2005 27 -3 387 15 100 2 14.4 100.3 0.19 
2010 28 -8 358 18 104 4 18.0 99.8 0.13 
2020 45 -16 263 24 110 16 17.3 100.3 0.06 
2030 65 -16 215 27 115 22 19.9 100.0 0.97 
2040 80 -28 158 30 123 37 18.8 100.2 0.47 
2050 97 -39 117 33 127 48 - 100.6 -0.17 
 
Table 4: Macroeconomic indicators for the EU-27 under the Fragmented Action CDM scenario 
 
 
  
World 
CO2 em. 
[% ‘90] 
CO2 
emis.  
[% ‘90] 
CO2/GDP 
intensity 
[g/€] 
Renew. 
share in 
elec. [%] 
Rel. ele. 
price    
[%] 
ETS CO2 
price   
[€/t] 
Term. of 
trade [% 
BAU2005] 
Welfare 
change 
[% REF] 
                  
2005 27 -7 371 15 100 5 100.3 0.00 
2010 27 -12 342 18 105 9 99.9 0.00 
2020 43 -25 235 26 120 38 100.4 -0.30 
2030 36 -40 154 31 126 54 100.7 -1.20 
2040 -7 -62 84 39 146 110 102.0 -3.17 
2050 -52 -79 40 51 163 164 104.3 -5.80 
 
Table 5: Macroeconomic indicators for the EU-27 under the Global Action scenario 
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World 
CO2 em. 
[% ‘90] 
CO2 
emis.  
[% ‘90] 
CO2/GDP 
intensity 
[g/€] 
Renew. 
share in 
elec. [%] 
Rel. ele. 
price     
[%] 
ETS CO2 
price   
[€/t] 
Term. of 
trade [% 
BAU2005] 
Welfare 
change 
[%] 
2005 27 -7 370 16 100 25 100.3 0.38 
2010 27 -12 340 18 100 17 99.8 0.09 
2020 44 -25 230 28 120 54 100.5 0.06 
2030 36 -40 150 39 140 99 100.4 0.04 
2040 -7 -62 80 56 171 227 101.7 -1.25 
2050 -51 -79 40 59 161 794 104.0 -3.45 
 
Table 6: Macroeconomic indicators for the EU-27 under the Global Action National scenario 
 
 
  
World 
CO2 em. 
[% ‘90] 
CO2 
emis.  
[% ‘90] 
CO2/GDP 
intensity 
[g/€] 
Renew. 
share in 
elec. [%] 
Rel. ele. 
price     
[%] 
ETS CO2 
price   
[€/t] 
Terms of 
trade [% 
BAU2005] 
Welfare 
change 
[%] 
2005 27 -7 370 15 100 5 100.3 0.00 
2010 27 -12 340 18 105 9 99.9 0.00 
2020 43 -25 240 26 120 38 100.4 -0.30 
2030 37 -1 250 31 109 11 99.7 1.35 
2040 -7 -27 160 39 129 73 100.7 0.06 
2050 -52 -67 60 51 176 362 103.5 -2.73 
 
Table 7: Macroeconomic indicators for the EU-27 under the Global Action International scenario 
 
3.1. Reference 
 
The Reference scenario includes existing EU policies, in particular a 20% reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions until 2020 vis-à-vis 1990 levels and an expansion of renewable energies to a share of 20% 
in energy consumption and an improvement in energy efficiency. (Herein, the EU 20-20-20 strategy7 
also aims at a 20% improvement in energy efficiency vis-à-vis a projected value in 2020. – Reference 
is in accordance with a 1.74% p.a. reduction in EU ETS emissions.) Other taxes and subsidies existing 
in the EU and the other regions in 2004/2005 are included as well. Moreover, the Reference scenario 
                                                          
7 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index_en.htm (accessed 08/2011). 
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includes the Copenhagen Pledges8 for 2020 and assumes that these pledges are kept constant after 
2020 – except for the EU-27 which reduces emissions in accordance with the Reference scenario in 
EU (2011). The Copenhagen Pledges lead to the following rounded emissions changes for the non-EU 
model regions in 2020 vis-à-vis 1990 in %:9  
 USA    -0.5 
 CAN     3.0 
 ANZ     5.5 
 RUS  -15.0 
 JPN  -25.0 
 RAX  -17.5 
Since we allow for intersectoral permit trade but not for international permit trade, CO2 prices differ 
across the model regions that have implemented an emissions pricing scheme and are equal within 
model regions in all scenarios. Herein, we do not distinguish between ETS and non-ETS sectors except 
in the EU-27. We rather assume that the emissions targets hold for the whole economies. 
In the EU-27, ETS sectors exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage receive 100% of 
benchmark allowances for free. Following the calculations by Graichen et al. (2010), p. 88, the 
average benchmark shares of free allowances in all allowances for these sectors in % are:10  
 OIL 86 
 PPP 77 
 FER 74 
 ORG 63 
 INO 63 
 CEM 92 
 BRT 70 
 ISM 91 
 ALU 80 
These calculations assume that the emissions of the ten most efficient per cent of installations are 
relevant for determining the amount of free allowances.11 This policy is kept until the model year 
2025. It is supposed to be removed after 2027 in reality, i.e. there will be no free allowances from 
model year 2030 on in the Reference scenario. In the other ETS sectors, except the energy sector 
(ISP, ONM, ONF) the average benchmark share of free allowances in all allowances is assumed to be 
                                                          
8 http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_15/copenhagen_accord/items/5264.php (accessed 08/2011). 
9 Negative values indicate the need for emission reductions below 1990 levels, positive values indicate that 
emissions can be increased above 1990 levels. Copenhagen intensity targets for China and India are not 
implemented. 
10 These shares are sectoral averages that can overestimate or underestimate the free allowances for single 
installations. 
11 EU (2009b), in particular Article (11). 
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40% of emissions in 2005. The volume of free allowances is reduced to 80% of this share in 2015, 
30% in 2020, 15% in 2025, and 0% from 2030 onwards.12  
Table 1 gives an overview of important macroeconomic indicators for the EU-27 and the 
world under the Reference scenario. The model is calibrated so that the indicators come close to the 
corresponding reference scenario values given by EU (2009, 2011). Therein, EU emissions targets and 
the distribution of emissions to ETS versus non-ETS sectors are strictly exogenous, denoted by ‘exo.’ 
Other indicators – such as the GDP growth rate of the EU-27 – denoted by ‘en./cal.’ are determined 
endogenously in the model, but the model has been adjusted in the calibration process so that they 
come close to the reference data given by EU (2009, 2011). The remaining indicators – such as the 
CO2 price – denoted by ‘end.’ are strictly endogenous. Global emissions are endogenous in this 
scenario but exogenous in later periods under Global Action when all model regions are subject to 
emissions caps. In any case, a comparison with real-world data and with other projections such as EU 
(2009, 2011) shows a good match. 
Due to the recent economic turbulences, GDP growth is relatively low between 2005 and 
2010, 0.5% p.a. in the EU-27 and 1.3% p.a. world-wide. It is assumed to recover thereafter to a rate 
of more than 2% p.a. until 2030 and declines after 2030 to around 1.5% p.a. in the EU-27 and about 
2% p.a. world-wide. 
in the EU is characterized in the following way: Consumption of coal, the energy Energy use 
carrier with the highest carbon intensity in the model, declines drastically – more than in EU (2009a); 
and oil consumption declines moderately – very similar to EU (2009a). The consumption of gas, the 
fossil energy carrier with the lowest carbon intensity, rises until 2030 since it is a low-carbon 
substitute for coal and declines thereafter since renewable energies become more important. – On 
the contrary, it already declines until 2030 in EU (2009a). Despite sustained economic growth (scale 
effect), electricity generation rises only slightly over the time horizon – and goes even down in 
certain periods of time. As a consequence, the EU energy intensity, computed as the sum of the 
consumption of coal, oil and gas and electricity generation, divided by the value of GDP continuously 
improves over time – almost by a factor 4 over the whole time horizon. This development of 
electricity generation and energy consumption is mainly given by the IEO (2008/2010) data. It is 
driven by efficiency gains due to technical progress (technique effect). It also captures sectoral shifts 
in production (composition effect). Another driver is the oil price which rises exogenously in the 
Business as Usual scenario following the time path in EU (2009a, 2011). Nevertheless, the oil price is 
relaxed in our policy experiments (including the reference scenario). This means, the oil price can 
                                                          
12 EU (2009b), in particular Article (11). 
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react to policy shocks. This will in particular be important when studying carbon leakage effects in 
the following sections. We assume that the gas price rises in the analogue way as the oil price, while 
the coal price stays constant over time. The real electricity price increases endogenously. According 
to our stylized model results, it will increase by less than 20% until 2050 vis-à-vis 2005. 
Of course, decarbonisation does not only require a reduction in the energy intensity of GDP, 
but also in the carbon intensity of GDP. For this purpose, the share of renewable energies in 
electricity generation rises endogenously to around 27% in 2020 and 34% in 2050.13 Global emissions 
arise endogenously determined by emissions caps for the Annex-I regions as described before, and 
by economic growth in the regions without emissions caps. As a result, global emissions almost 
double until 2050 vis-à-vis 1990 in this scenario. Herein, all emissions generated by the model cover 
CO2 emissions only – no other greenhouse gas emissions. EU CO2 emissions decline by about 20% 
vis-à-vis 1990 until 2020 and 40% until 2050. Herein, our model does not consider that other 
greenhouse gases contribute a 5 to 6% reduction.14 Furthermore, the share of emissions within the 
EU emissions trading scheme (ETS) of more than 50% in earlier periods declines in later periods so 
that relatively more emissions are allowed in non-ETS sectors – following EU (2009a, 2011). The 
emission intensity (CO2 per GDP) declines to less than one third of the 2005 level until 2050. This 
development of the emission intensity matches the development that can be calculated from the 
Reference Scenario in EU (2009a). The resulting growth rate of the carbon intensity is a measure for 
carbon (and energy) saving technical progress – as well as sectoral shifts and input substitution. 
Obviously, the decline rate of the carbon intensity must be higher than the GDP growth rate in order 
to achieve emissions reductions in total. Furthermore, the endogenous CO2 price reaches about 
30€/t in ETS sectors until 2030. The CO2 price will significantly increase in later periods when the 
emissions targets become tighter – possibly reaching up to 60€/t in 2050 – similar to EU (2011).15 
Marginal abatement costs are substantially higher in non-ETS sectors than in ETS sectors – possibly 
reaching up to 250€/t around 2030. The marginal abatement costs will substantially decrease 
thereafter due to the rising share of non-ETS emissions in all emissions given by EU (2009a). Therein, 
the model offers cheap reduction options in ETS sectors, in particular in electricity generation with a 
good possibility to substitute fossil inputs by non-fossil inputs. The production of non-ETS sectors is 
                                                          
13 The use of renewables is determined endogenously. Nevertheless, the energy mix and thus the renewables 
share depend on the elasticities of substitution within each energy technology. This creates some degree of 
freedom. Therefore, we set the elasticities so that the CO2 price in 2050 comes close to the CO2 price in the 
Reference scenario in EU (2011). The resulting renewables share is somewhat lower than in EU (2011).  
14  The yearly emission reductions for the Reference as well as the Fragmented and Global action scenario for 
the EU-27 are taken from EU, 2011, short version, p. 5, Figure 1. 
15 While the CO2 prices reaches 50€/t from 2035 on in EU (2011), it rises steadily and exceeds 50€/t in 2050 in 
our simulation. 
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often absorbed by final consumption without good substitution possibilities. Herein, we do not 
model cheap non-CO2 reduction possibilities in non-ETS sectors. 
The European terms of trade are measured relative to the terms of trade in Business as Usual 
without any climate policy in 2005 (100%). They are computed in form of a Laspeyres price index for 
exports divided by imports. They change slightly in the Reference scenario with a vague tendency to 
increase. Notably, regarding international trade, we do not take trade changes in trade deficits or 
surpluses into account. This means, trade deficits or surpluses can change over time or between 
policy scenarios without requiring a balanced trade budget. 
 The lower right column reports mitigation costs in form of welfare changes between the 
Reference Action scenario and a Business as Usual scenario without climate policy (in particular 
without any emissions caps) for the EU-27 within each time period.16 Herein, the welfare change is 
measured as the Hicks Equivalent Variation referring to the change in expenditures (in value form) of 
the representative EU consumer. Relative mitigation costs stay clearly below 1% until 2020. 
Thereafter, they reach numbers around 1.5% and finally decline, presumably due to the extended 
use of renewable energies in our model.17 
 
3.2. Fragmented Action 
 
The Fragmented Action scenario assumes unilateral efforts by the EU-27 to reduce CO2 emissions by 
80% in 2050 vis-à-vis 1990. Emission reductions, as shown in Table 2, follow the EU Decarbonisation 
Roadmap 2050 (EU, 2011) over time. In this scenario free allowances for sectors exposed to a 
significant risk of carbon leakage are still abandoned from 2030 on. The revenues from auctioning 
the remaining allowances are given to the representative consumer in a lump-sum way. 
Table 2 summarizes the results in form of the most important macro-economic indicators for 
the EU-27 and in form of global CO2 emissions. EU CO2 emissions are forced to decline by 25% 
relative to the 1990 level in 2020, 40% in 2030, 62% in 2040, and 80% in 2050. As a result, global 
emissions increase only by 90% instead of 97% in Reference by 2050. As a consequence of the EU 
climate policy, the EU emission intensity, i.e. CO2 per GDP, has to decline drastically – almost by a 
factor ten. The EU share of renewable energies in electricity generation now increases endogenously 
                                                          
16 For instance, ConsumptionREF 2020 /  ConsumptionBAU 2020 - 1. 
17 This is also on account of the rising elasticity of substitution between the fixed factor and the other input 
factors in the production functions of energy technologies. 
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to over 50% in 2050 as in EU (2011). The electricity price increases by almost 60% until 2050 vis-à-vis 
2005.18 The endogenous CO2 price in EU ETS sectors reaches almost 40€/t in 2020, 50€/t in 2030, less 
than 150€/t in 2040 and possibly more than 150€/t in 2050. The latter is very similar to the price of 
147€/t reported in EU (2011, extended version, p. 117) for the scenario ‘fragmented action, 
reference fossil fuel prices’.19 In non-ETS sectors, marginal abatement costs could become very high.  
Table 2 also reports leakage rates for the Fragmented Action scenario in comparison to the 
Reference scenario for each period. The leakage rate is defined as the increase in emissions in the 
regions without an emission cap (CHN, IND, MEX, BRA, SIM, ROW) divided by the decrease in 
emissions in Europe. Accordingly, the leakage rate rises to values just below 20%.20 Therein, leakage 
can occur through two channels: First, sectoral production can decline in Europe and increase 
elsewhere while commodities can be imported from elsewhere to Europe. This channel can be called 
‘relocation effect’. Second, EU climate policy induces a decline in fossil fuel demand which lowers 
global fossil fuel prices. This in turn enhances fossil fuel demand elsewhere. This channel can be 
called ‘price effect’. Most numerical studies find that the price effect dominates the relocation effect 
by far (compare e.g. Böhringer et al., 2010). Given that the price effect dominates, the carbon 
leakage rate that we find does not directly translate into a firm relocation rate or an investment 
leakage rate. Moreover, the table reports the European terms of trade. According to the model 
results, the terms of trade improve slightly compared to the Reference scenario in later periods.21 
The reason could be that the production cost increase due to the European carbon pricing can be 
transferred to product and thus export prices while import prices are hardly affected by European 
carbon pricing. In this sense, part of the climate policy costs is transmitted to consumers abroad via 
higher export good prices. 
The right column of Table 2 reports mitigation costs in form of welfare changes between the 
Fragmented Action scenario and the Reference scenario for the EU-27 (measured as the Hicks 
Equivalent Variation referring to expenditure changes of the representative EU consumer). Relative 
mitigation costs stay close above 0% until 2020. They might rise from 1% in 2025 to over 3% in 2040 
and around 5% in the 2040s. The mitigation costs in the final periods need to be treated with 
caution, though: Obviously, the ambitious emission cuts in late periods create increasingly high costs 
                                                          
18 All prices are absolute prices referring to the base year 2005; nominal prices can of course increase to a 
larger extent. 
19 The lower bound of the CO2 price in EU ETS sectors in the different scenarios reported in EU (2011, extended 
version, p. 117) is 104€/t, the upper bound is 370€/t. 
20 Other CGE studies find leakage rates in a range of 15 to 30% (Babiker and Rutherford, 2005), but outliers are 
also possible. 
21 The terms of trade are defined as the price of exports relative to the price of imports based on a Laspeyres 
price index. 
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(in form of increasing consumption losses) due to convex marginal abatement costs in our model. 
However, this is a technical outcome that can be different in reality and in other models. Allowing for 
higher elasticities of energy supply for the different energy technologies and different elasticities of 
substitution in the production function can reduce the carbon price and to some extent reduce 
mitigation costs. When taking backstop (breakthrough) technologies into account, mitigation costs 
could substantially drop. For instance, CCS is excluded in the scenarios. Furthermore, we only look at 
CO2 emissions, not at other greenhouse gases. Other greenhouse gases would enable new, cheaper 
reduction options. And as any other numerical analysis, our assessment is subject to uncertainties in 
future economic development including technical progress which is exogenous in our assessment. 
Our detailed sectoral analysis for all sectors and all model periods in the EU (Table O2 in 
Appendix O22) also yields relative sectoral output changes between the Fragmented Action scenario 
and the Reference scenario measured within each year.23 Fossil fuel extraction and further 
production could drastically decline in Europe: GAS is reduced by 50 to 75% in the 2040s, COL by 35 
to 65%, CRU by 10 to 20% and OIL by 35 to 60%. ‘Transport’ (TRN) activities are reduced by around 
20%. Among the industrial production sectors, ‘Other chemicals’ (OCR) suffer the highest output 
reduction of around 15% in the 2040s, followed by ‘Fertilizers’ (FER), ‘Inorganic chemicals’ (INO) and 
‘Organic chemicals’ (ORG) with reductions of around 7%. On the contrary, the sectors ‘Electricity and 
heat’ (ELE) and ‘Machinery and other manufacturing’ (MCH) could slightly benefit from drastic 
climate targets according to the model results. Herein, ‘Electricity and heat’ generation declines until 
2040, but rises thereafter because the extended use of renewable energies enables electricity 
generation with low emissions. Notably, our sectoral results for 2020 and 2030 are very similar to 
those reported in EU (2011, extended version, pp. 44, 45).24 
Moreover, our sectoral analysis (Table I2 in Appendix I) looks at relative changes in the 
sectoral capital stocks between the Fragmented Action scenario and the Reference scenario for each 
year in the EU. They are an indicator for investment in physical capital and how this is affected by 
climate policy. Besides investment in ‘fresh’ facilities, they also capture depreciation and shifts of 
                                                          
22 The supplementary online appendix is available upon request. 
23 Table O1 is intentionally left out in the supplementary appendix since we do not study sectoral effects under 
the Reference scenario.  
The investment good sector, ‘CGD’ is not reported since it is an artificial model sector rather than a real sector, 
and it differs from the other sectors in its functional form. 
24 The results have been computed using the model ‘GEM E3’. Therein, ‘GDP’ impacts are around -0.1% in 2020 
and around -0.8% in 2030 for the ETS industry (without including opportunity costs of free allocation in the 
presence of a carbon price in non-ETS sectors). Correspondingly, sectoral impacts are about -1.8% in 2030 in 
energy intensive industries, -2.3% in 2030 for chemicals and -1.7% for ferrous and non-ferrous metals. We do 
not find positive impacts of free allocation without considering opportunity costs in 2020, though. There are no 
further sectoral results reported in EU (2011), either.  
19 
 
existing capital across sectors. Changes in the capital stocks naturally show a similar structure as the 
changes in output values. But there are differences, though. A number of sectors show positive 
values (e.g. MIN, CEM, BRT, ISM, ISP, MCH, TWL, SER). This indicates an extension of the capital stock 
due to capital or investment reallocation effects induced by more stringent climate policy. Other 
sectors have negative values (e.g. the chemical and the fossil sectors, ALU, ONF, PPP and TRN) that 
can be higher or lower than the corresponding output reductions. Against this backdrop, the 
examination of investment patterns first reveals the shift of capital from certain sectors to other 
sectors. Second, it reveals that in sectors with smaller losses in investment than in output, the output 
reduction is to a smaller extent driven by capital reductions than reductions in other inputs. While 
sectoral investments show substantial shifts between sectors, total EU investment is hardly affected 
by climate policy in the model. 
The analysis (Table E2 in Appendix E) also investigates relative changes in direct sectoral CO2 
emissions for each year vis-à-vis the emissions in the same sector in 2005 under Fragmented Action 
in the EU. Direct emissions mean those emissions that are generated within sectors by burning fossil 
fuels, not emissions that are indirectly used via inputs such as electricity that implicitly contain fossil 
fuels. This is one reason why the emission effects can differ from the output or costs effects. 
Accordingly, relative emission reductions differ widely across sectors. Additionally, the underlying 
reductions in absolute terms can widely differ across sectors. Relative reductions are around 40% in 
energy intensive chemical sectors (FER, ORG, INO), ‘Other non-ferrous metals’ (ONF) and ‘Paper, pulp 
and printing’ (PPP) at the lower bound. They are roughly around 85% in fossil fuel sectors (OIL, GAS, 
COL) and in not energy intensive non-ETS sectors (FAW, TWL, SER) as well as in ‘Mining and 
construction’ (MIN) and ‘Machinery and other manufacturing’ (MCH).25 In the remaining sectors, 
emission reductions lie between those. The sectoral development of emissions is visualized in Figure 
E1 in Appendix E. (The legend follows the ranking of emissions cuts in 2050 from top to bottom.) The 
figure reveals that in 2010 several sectors are still able to increase their emissions above 2005 levels 
due to EU emissions trading. In the following periods, all sectors need to cut emissions. Herein, the 
spread of relative emissions cuts across sectors becomes wider. In late periods the reduction spread 
reaches from less than 40% to 90%.  
The sectoral analysis (Table C2 in Appendix C) finally studies changes in the competitiveness 
of EU sectors. Competitiveness is measured in form of world trade shares following Balassa (1965), 
Reichel (2002) and Böhringer and Alexeeva-Talebi (2011). According to Böhringer and Alexeeva-
                                                          
25 Note that fossil fuels (COL, GAS, CRU) denote extraction and production in Europe or further processing in 
Europe (OIL). 
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Talebi (2011), the index that we use first computes the share of the export value of a certain sector 
of a certain region in the world export value of this sector. The index second computes the share of 
the total export value of a certain region in the whole world export value summed up over all 
sectors. It third computes the ratio of both shares. If the sectoral share in world exports is identical to 
the economy-wide share in world exports, the index will take the value of one. A region is said to 
have a comparative advantage in a certain sector if the index exceeds one. Conversely, a region is 
said to have a comparative disadvantage in a sector if the index takes a value between zero and one. 
In this sense, the world trade share index shows the importance of a certain sector relative to other 
sectors in the economy regarding the global export market. It can also show how this importance is 
affected by policy shocks such as our policy scenarios. Again, the pattern of the competitiveness 
effects is naturally similar to the pattern of the output effects. We now look at relative changes in the 
competitiveness index relative to the Reference scenario. Now, differences between policy induced 
output changes and investment changes can occur because sectors are to different extents engaged 
in international trade; and producers and the consumer have different possibilities of switching their 
exports and (intermediate) imports between domestic and foreign markets. It turns out that many 
sectors could benefit from more stringent climate policy in terms of competitiveness (e.g. MIN, PPP, 
CEM, ONM, ISP, CRU, MCH, FAW, TWL, SER). The positive numbers express that these sectors have 
gained a higher importance among EU sectors in export markets due to more stringent climate 
policy. These outcomes might change when using different Armington elasticities (compare section 
‘Discussion’). 
Figures 1 and 2 summarize the sectoral findings. Figure 1 visualizes the sectoral emissions 
paths in the EU-27 under Fragmented Action over time. Emissions are reported as percentage 
changes for each period versus 2005 emissions levels within each sector. The emissions paths reflect 
the market-efficient allocation of allowances across sectors neglecting transaction costs. As a result, 
in 2010 low energy sectors (TWL, MCH, SER, MIN, FAW, OCR, plotted in green) are obviously able to 
increase emissions. But this is not observed from 2015 on anymore. Low-energy sectors then 
decrease emissions to a relatively large extent due to their low energy and emissions input shares 
and relatively low marginal abatement costs. These high relative emissions reductions represent 
small emissions reductions in absolute terms though because low-energy sectors produce small 
emissions volumes. Figure 2 which refers to the period 2040 also reveals that low-energy sectors gain 
in terms of investment and competitiveness. Since total EU investment is given, an investment 
reduction in energy-intensive sectors results in an investment increase in low-energy sectors. 
Similarly, the competitiveness with regard to exports decreases in energy-intensive sectors but 
increase in low-energy sectors. 
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Figure 1: Relative emissions changes in the various model periods vis-à-vis 2005 under the 
Fragmented Action scenario in EU-27 sectors in % 
 
Among the fossil fuel sectors (fossil fuel extraction COL, GAS, CRU and refinement OIL, plotted in 
brown) ‘Gas’ also behaves as a low-energy sector in terms of its own direct emissions created when 
burning fossil fuels in gas extraction (and further production). As Figure 2 shows, the output of GAS 
(and investment and competitiveness) decreases strongly as well. This happens because the demand 
for gas declines due to climate policy. Following the same logic, direct emissions, fossil fuel output, 
investment and competitiveness strongly decline in the other fossil fuel sectors OIL and COL in later 
periods. ‘Crude oil’ extraction is less affected though. Two sectors are in general crucial for achieving 
stringent emissions targets since they contribute a large share to total emissions: ‘Transport’ (TRN) 
and ‘Electricity and heat’ (ELE). Indeed, these sectors show high relative emissions reductions in 
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Figure 1 (in red), and high emissions and output reductions in Figure 2.26 Competitiveness losses with 
regard to exports are high in these sectors, but exports play in total only a minor role in these 
sectors. The energy intensive sectors (PPP, ORG, ONF, INO, FER, ISP, ONM, CEM, ALU, ISM, BRT, 
plotted in blue and magenta) reduce emissions to smaller extents in relative terms over time (Figure 
1). Their emissions reductions in absolute terms are nonetheless rather high. At the same time, their 
relative output reductions (Figure 2) are rather high. This reflects their high marginal abatement 
costs. 
 
 
Figure 2: Relative emissions, output, investment and competitiveness changes in the period 2040 vis-
à-vis 2005 under the Fragmented Action scenario in EU-27 sectors in % 
 
To conclude, our sectoral analysis shows that the sectoral differences in the impacts of climate policy 
can be pronounced and vary across the sectoral indicators under scrutiny. We abstain from such a 
detailed visualization and discussion of the results for every scenario. Yet the reader can find the 
underlying data in the supplementary appendix (available upon request). 
 
                                                          
26 Investment changes are not available for ELE because different to the other sectors, ELE is modeled in a 
simple bottom-up module. 
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3.3. Fragmented Action Free 
 
The Fragmented Action Free scenario uses the same assumptions as the Fragmented Action scenario. 
The difference is that free allocation of allowances for sectors exposed to a significant risk of carbon 
leakage according to the existing EU benchmarking scheme is sustained until 2050. The shares of free 
allowances are the same as in the Reference scenario. Free allocation ceases in 2030 for other 
sectors, though. 
Table 3 summarizes the macro-economic results. EU CO2 emissions are subject to the same 
targets as under Fragmented Action. Thus, global emissions are not affected either. The share of 
renewable energies in electricity generation is in general slightly lower than under Fragmented 
Action. The electricity price is in general higher than under Fragmented Action. It increases almost by 
70% until 2050 vis-à-vis 2005. The CO2 price in ETS sectors reaches around 40€/t in 2020, 60€/t in 
2030, and 150€/t in 2045. This is in general somewhat higher than under Fragmented Action. The 
CO2 price might reach 190€/t in 2050.27 (190€/t equals the CO2 price in EU, 2011, under the scenario 
‘effective technology, fragmented action, low fossil fuel prices’.) In non-ETS sectors, marginal 
abatement costs would become extremely high in our analysis – even significantly higher than under 
Fragmented Action. The leakage rate seems to go down from 2030 on compared to Fragmented 
Action. Conversely, the terms of trade seem to slightly worsen from 2030 on. Mitigation costs, 
measured as the change in expenditures of the representative consumer (welfare change), become 
somewhat higher than under Fragmented Action, particularly in late periods. Obviously, the 
sustained free allocation of allowances for sectors exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage 
creates extra macroeconomic costs. 
Our sectoral analysis (Table O3 in the Appendix) identifies relative output changes between 
the Fragmented Action Free Allocation scenario and the Reference scenario in EU-27 sectors. The 
output of the non-ETS sectors, ‘Natural gas’ (GAS) and ‘Coal’ (COL), ‘Electricity and heat’ (ELE), ‘Food, 
agriculture and wood’ (FAW), ‘Textiles, wearing, apparel and leather’ (TWL), ‘Transportation’ (TRN) 
and ‘Services’ (SER) decreases under Fragmented Action Free until 2050 compared to Fragmented 
Action; the output of all other sectors rises due to sustained free allocation (or stays at least constant 
in case of ‘Other chemicals’, OCR). ‘Manufacturing of iron and steel’ (ISM) would in particular gain. 
Moreover, sustained allocation of free allowances triggers a shift from coal and gas to oil use – since 
only the latter is now supported in our model. This model result is to be taken with caution; it 
depends on the choice of elasticities of substitution and probably overstates the real effects. 
                                                          
27 The results for 2050 should be taken with caution regarding its numerical feasibility, though. 
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Interestingly, not only the leakage sectors (OIL, PPP, FER, ORG, INO, CEM, BRT, ISM, ALU) gain from 
the sustained free allocation policy but also the remaining ETS sectors (ISP, ONM, ONF) – but at the 
expense of non-ETS sectors. These effects are also reflected in the development of the sectoral 
capital stocks as an indicator for investment, in sectoral emission reductions, and in changes in the 
competitiveness.28  
In summary, a sustained allocation of free allowances to sectors exposed to a significant risk 
of carbon leakage (benchmarking) could be beneficial for almost all industry sectors – not only for 
those sectors that receive free allowances. This indicates advantages with respect to competitiveness 
of some EU sectors – but it comes at the expense of higher costs for the EU. 
 
3.4. Fragmented Action CDM 
 
The Fragmented Action CDM scenario assumes the availability of the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) in its current form until 2020 and in an analogue way thereafter. Herein, we 
understand CDM in the sense of ‘where’-flexibility, this means the reduction of emissions where it is 
cheapest, such as in developing countries without an emissions price, not in the sense of a project-
based mechanism associated with technology transfer. The EU-27 is the only recipient of CDM 
credits. Non-Annex-I countries (CHN, IND, BRA, MEX, SIM, ROW) are the sources of CDM credits. We 
neglect transaction costs and investment risks of CDM in this analysis. Until 2020, up to 50% of the 
emissions reduction effort between the Business as Usual scenario and the Fragmented Action 
scenario for each year can be attributed to EU ETS sectors in form of CDM credits. Up to 3% of the 
emissions in 2005 can be attributed to non-ETS sectors via the government. After 2020, it is assumed 
that 50% of the reduction effort of ETS sectors can be attributed to CDM and 50% of the reduction 
effort of non-ETS sectors can be attributed to CDM as well. This allows huge amounts of emission 
reductions via CDM. All other assumptions are the same as in the Fragmented Action scenario. 
Table 4 summarizes the macro-economic impacts: Obviously, the EU-27 achieves substantial 
emission reductions abroad via CDM accounting for up to 41 percentage points of relative emissions 
in 2050 (compare the second column in Table 2 and Table 4). This leads to a CO2 intensity that is 
                                                          
28 The competitiveness results for OIL, GAS, COL and CRU in late periods appear to be outliers. Obviously, a very 
strong switch from cola and gas to oil occurs due to the free allocation of allowances for refined oil and coal 
products. Nonetheless, the relative changes say nothing about the competitiveness index in absolute terms. In 
absolute terms, the competitiveness index is very low for CRU, COL and GAS, for instance, under Reference as 
well as Fragmented Action Free. In this sense, the tables show in some cases strong changes in relative terms, 
but small changes in absolute terms 
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almost four times as high as without CDM. The renewables share declines to above 30% in the 2040s. 
The relative electricity price is much lower than under Fragmented Action. This is due to a much 
lower ETS CO2 price of under 50€/t until 2050 as well as drastically lower non-ETS marginal 
abatement costs of around 100€/t in 2020 and 150€/t in 2040. Now the EU-27 achieves small welfare 
gains in all periods except 2045 compared to the Reference scenario. The question is, however, 
whether such an intensive use of CDM will be politically and technically feasible. 
Furthermore, our analysis (Table O429) shows the sectoral impacts on the EU-27: Compared 
to Fragmented Action without CDM, all sectors are better off. (Only ‘Investment good’ production, 
CGD, is always kept constant). It also reveals that the investment pattern (Table I4), i.e. the 
expansion or reduction of sectoral capital stocks, changes due to the extension of CDM. Not 
surprisingly, the necessary sectoral emission reductions (Table E4) become lower than under 
Fragmented Action without CDM. Moreover, the competitiveness effects (Table C4) appear diverse 
relative to Reference and relative to Fragmented Action without CDM. 
In summary, the EU would gain from an extensive use of CDM at the macro level, and this 
gain translates to the sectoral level: All sectors would gain from an extensive future use of CDM. 
However, the assumption on the extent of CDM use is very optimistic. Moreover, we model the 
import of emission reductions from abroad but not technology transfer to abroad. And importantly, 
reaching reasonable global climate targets requires global climate action. – European climate policy 
with CDM will not reduce global emissions sufficiently. Compared to the Global Action scenarios, the 
Fragmented Action CDM scenario leads to higher climate change related damages in the EU and 
elsewhere. These damages are not taken into account in the results in the tables. Compared to 
Global Action, CDM allows the EU to reap “low-hanging fruits” in developing countries that will be 
locally “harvested” under Global Action. 
 
3.5. Global Action 
 
The Global Action scenario assumes the same emissions targets for the EU-27 as the Fragmented 
Action scenario and the same Copenhagen Pledges for 2020 as well. The difference is that the 
industrialized countries subject to Copenhagen Pledges extend their climate efforts, now reaching a 
80% emission reduction in 2050 vis-à-vis 1990 as the EU does (EU, 2011, extended version, pp. 37, 
38). The transition from the Copenhagen targets to the 80% targets occurs gradually over time. The 
                                                          
29 The supplementary online appendix is available upon request. 
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developing countries also take responsibility by reducing emissions after 2020 down to their 1990 
levels in 2050 (compare EU, 2011). The resulting global emission reduction in 2050 vis-à-vis 1990 is 
52% (as shown in the first column of Table 5). This means, we are now in another future with lower 
climate change related damages which results in lower costs compared to Fragmented Action. These 
avoided climate change damages are not captured in our simulations, though. All other assumptions 
are the same as in the Fragmented Action scenario. This includes the assumption that carbon prices 
differ across regions but are equal within regions except in the EU-27. Herein, we assume that the 
emissions targets cover all sectors in non-EU economies. 
Table 5 summarizes the macro-economic impacts for the EU-27: The EU ETS CO2 price is 
higher than under Fragmented Action and the marginal abatement costs in non-ETS as well. A main 
reason for this is that imports from other regions become more expensive due to the introduction of 
carbon pricing. Therefore, EU demand shifts from imports to domestic production, which raises the 
EU use of fossil fuels and drives up the EU carbon price. Another likely reason is carbon leakage 
through the price effect – now in the opposite way as before: Carbon pricing abroad reduces the 
demand for fossil fuels and hence reduces the global fossil fuel prices. This might result in an 
extended use of fossil fuels in the EU, which again drives up the EU carbon price. (Our CO2 price is 
lower than the price of 190 to 370€/t in the EU, 2011, Global Action scenarios.) Global Action slightly 
reduces the welfare loss compared to Fragmented Action. The terms of trade improve compared to 
Fragmented Action. The reason for this could be that foreign competitors now face a carbon price as 
well which levels off the carbon ‘playing field’. The overall small macroeconomic differences between 
Fragmented and Global Action stem from the assumption that the climate targets for the EU-27 are 
kept equal to Fragmented Action and that international emissions trading is not allowed. As a 
consequence, the differences in the results stem from international trade and leakage effects. 
(Leakage rates are not reported in the global scenarios because all countries face emission caps in 
later periods.) 
Our analysis furthermore shows that the sectoral impacts are diverse in late periods: Several 
sectors – in particular the chemical sectors (FER, ORG, INO, OCR) and ‘Further processing of iron and 
steel’ (ISP) – gain strongly compared to Fragmented Action. This indicates an improvement in the 
international competitiveness of these sectors. A number of other sectors (OIL, CEM, BRT, ONM, ISM, 
ISP, ALU, ONF, ELE and TRN) are better off too while the remaining sectors are worse off. ‘Electricity 
and heat’ (ELE) seems to benefit from Global Action. This can have several reasons: First, Global 
prices for fossil fuels decline since climate policy reduces demand for fossil fuels abroad. Second, 
demand shifts to some extent from (emissions intensive) imports to domestic sales. It can roughly be 
said in terms of competitiveness that ETS sectors are better off while non-ETS sectors are worse off. 
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The sectors that gain strongly in terms of output also gain strongly in terms of competitiveness. 
Interestingly, Global Action appears to raise capital stocks and thus investment in the EU compared 
to Fragmented Action except EU fossil fuel extraction and production (COL, GAS, CRU, OIL) and 
‘Machinery and other manufacturing’ (MCH). In accordance with the output effects that we 
observed, we find a strong competitiveness gain for ‘Electricity and heat’ due to Global Action. 
In summary, global climate action is inevitable to reach the necessary climate targets. 
Without international emissions trading, the pure macroeconomic effects on the EU appear small, 
though. And the sectoral effects induced by changes in the trade pattern appear diverse. In 
particular, several energy intensive sectors could benefit because their competitiveness would 
improve towards foreign producers that would now also face carbon prices. However, like most CGE 
models, our model does not capture firm’s decision to deliver foreign markets via exports or FDI or to 
stay with the domestic market instead (along the lines of the Melitz model, e.g. Melitz and Ottaviano, 
2008). As a consequence, it probably underestimates firms’ international relocation. 
 
3.6. Global Action National 
 
The Global Action National scenario assumes an equalisation of CO2 prices across ETS and non-ETS 
sectors in the EU. (There is no distinction between ETS and non-ETS sectors in other regions and no 
international emission trading as before). This assumption might be optimistic, but it has a clear 
intention: It shall reveal the costs created by the CO2 price differential between ETS and non-ETS 
sectors. 
The results reported in Table 6 indicate a substantial reduction in mitigation costs (welfare 
losses) from around 4% to around 2% in the 2040s. The CO2 price in ETS sectors would substantially 
increase – to between 200 and 500€/t in the 2040s, since part of the burden of non-ETS sectors is 
shifted to ETS sectors. Herein, the sharp increase in the CO2 price in 2045 and 2050 indicates a strong 
convexity of marginal abatement costs that becomes obvious when emission cuts reach over 80%. 
The CO2 price and the mitigation costs reported for late periods need to be taken with caution, 
though. 
Again, we also examine sectoral output changes, which appear diverse. Several sectors such 
as ‘Other chemicals’ (OCR) ‘Crude oil’ (CRU) and ‘Transportation’ (TRN) clearly gain compared to 
Global Action. OIL, GAS, ‘Electricity and heat’ (ELE) and ‘Food, agriculture and wood’ (FAW) also 
appear to gain. The other sectors might lose or be equally off. 
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 In summary, in our model, the equalization of the carbon price across all sectors within the 
EU has a high potential to reduce European mitigation costs. On the sectoral level, the effects appear 
again diverse. 
 
3.7. Global Action International 
 
For Global Action International we assume an equalisation of CO2 prices across ETS and non-ETS 
sectors in the EU as well as across all world regions. Herein, we keep exactly the Global Action 
scenario until 2020. From 2025 on, when the developing regions will introduce climate policies, we 
allow for international emissions trading as well.30  
Under this scenario, the EU-27 is even better off than under the Reference scenario in the 
periods 2025 to 2040 due to the efficiency gains from an equalised world market price for CO2 via 
international emissions trading. The CO2 price will drop in 2025 when the developing countries 
introduce emissions caps and participate in global emissions trading. By this means, the global ETS 
can almost disburden the EU from all mitigation costs in 2025.31 The positive effects also exceed 
those under Fragmented Action CDM between 2025 and 2035 because the potential of buying 
additional allowances at low costs is even larger via the global ETS than via CDM. In 2035, for 
example, the actual EU emissions reduction is 21% under Fragmented Action CDM but only 11% 
under Global Action International. In 2050 the EU can buy further allowances and reduce its 
emissions reduction to 67% instead of over 80% vis-à-vis 1990. From 2045 on, mitigation costs 
become higher than under Fragmented Action CDM, though. A look at the – now global – CO2 price 
in these years shows that CO2 allowances can become quite costly. This happens because all Annex-I 
regions will face tight emissions targets in 2045 and 2050 under Global Action, and the developing 
countries will go back to their 1990 emissions levels. This drives up the global CO2 price and raises EU 
mitigation costs reaching around 2% of the consumption value since the EU cannot buy cheap 
allowances from abroad anymore. (In later periods, the carbon price can become higher than under 
pure ‘Global Action’, but lower than under ‘Global Action National’.) Nevertheless, mitigation costs 
decline compared to Global Action and Global Action National in all periods with global emissions 
trading. Obviously, a global CO2 price bears a high potential for achieving emission reductions in an 
efficient way. 
                                                          
30 This creates a kind of structural break in the results between 2020 and 2025. 
31 The positive effect in 2025 Table 7 almost matches the negative effect in 2025 in Table 1. 
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The sectoral effects show that those sectors that can benefit from Global Action can 
additionally benefit from international emissions trading. Besides that, the sectors that can benefit 
from Global Action National can do so under Global Action International (except ELE). The general 
picture is that more than half of the sectors are better off than under pure Global Action. The 
remaining sectoral effects reported in the Appendix can be interpreted along the lines of the 
previous sections. In this sense, Global Action International combines the benefits of pure Global 
Action, Global Action National and international emissions trading, which is visible in the sectoral 
results. 
In summary, international emissions trading enables the EU to benefit significantly from 
global climate action. This positive effect also translates to most sectors. 
4. Discussion 
 
We have assessed the EU Decarbonisation Roadmap 2050 targeting at a 80% reduction in 
greenhouse gases until 2050 vis-à-vis 1990. The resulting time path of the CO2 price and of 
mitigation costs in the EU-27 indicates that the costs stay low to moderate – in the range of zero to 
2% of consumption expenditures – until 2035. Thereafter, the reduction target will come closer to 
80% so that the CO2 price in EU ETS sectors might sharply increase, and marginal abatement costs in 
non-ETS sectors might become challenging. The following subsections discuss the results, first 
focusing on welfare effects and then on technological aspects, leading to a summarizing discussion. 
 
4.1. Welfare Effects 
 
Figure 3 summarizes the welfare analysis of the different policy scenarios for the time period 2040. 
Our Reference scenario already embodies mitigation costs of more than 1% with respect to the total 
consumption value compared to a Business as Usual scenario without any climate policy. The costs 
reported for the other scenarios come on top of this. They amount to more than 3% under 
Fragmented Action – which slightly increases in case of sustained free allocation of allowances for 
leakage sectors. Mitigation costs are negative, i.e. they turn into a surplus relative to Reference, in 
case of an extensive future use of CDM. However, this surplus comes on top of the costs embodied in 
the Reference scenario such that there are still mitigation costs relative to Business as Usual. 
Similarly, Global Action International creates a small welfare gain compared to Reference while it still 
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creates costs relative to Business as Usual. This means, the global CO2 price equalization removes the 
additional costs of the Roadmap for the EU in 2040. Compared to Global Action, our CDM scenario 
allows reaping “low-hanging fruits” in developing countries that will be locally “harvested” under 
Global Action. This is especially true for later periods (2045 and 2050) when global Action drives up 
the global CO2 price such that the EU cannot buy cheap allowances from abroad anymore (see 
section 3.7). However, such an extensive use of CDM involves concerns regarding its technical and 
political feasibility: Transaction costs and investment risks, both not taken into account in our 
analysis, hinder CDM activities. The large-scale use of CDM that we assume will probably require a 
new organizational framework which is not too much structured on a project level but maybe on a 
sectoral or economy-wide level. Moreover, it has been questions that CDM always creates new 
emissions reduction activities. It can rather happen that projects would have been realized anyway, 
even without CDM. Taking these aspects into account and making a less optimistic assumption 
regarding the limit of CDM use in the EU ETS would clearly reduce the positive impacts of CDM on 
the EU that we find. Finally, the ambitious reduction efforts of the EU can become mainly window 
dressing if half of the reduction actually occurs abroad. In this sense, the extensive use of CDM 
counteracts the achievement of drastic global reductions. Global Action, however, will only slightly 
reduce the costs compared to Fragmented Action if there is no equalization of carbon prices, though. 
Mitigation costs substantially drop when equalizing the carbon price across sectors and regions. 
 The costs we find are sometimes higher than in other studies that examine the 2°C climate 
target and find cumulated discounted costs of around 1% (for example Leimbach et al., 2010, for the 
EU until 2100; Hübler, 2010, for the industrialized countries until 2050; Edenhofer et al., 2010, for the 
world until 2100 within the model comparison project ADAM).32 However, the costs we find strongly 
differ across scenarios: The costs under Global Action International or Fragmented Action CDM come 
close to the costs in other (Integrated Assessment) studies; whereas the costs become substantially 
higher in our scenarios that assume inefficiencies due to different CO2 prices across sectors or 
regions. Such inefficiencies are often not included in global-scale integrated assessment models. In 
our study, the high marginal abatement costs in non-ETS sectors and the resulting large price 
differential between ETS and non-ETS sectors drive the high mitigation costs to a large extent. 
Herein, one cost driver in the non-ETS field in our model is probably the unavailability of non-CO2 
mitigation options. These options could lead to emission reductions at relatively low costs. 
                                                          
32 Due to different scenario assumptions and accumulating and discounting, these costs are not directly 
comparable to ours, though. For example, different to our study, Leimbach et al. (2010) and Hübler (2010) 
assume a Contraction and Convergence (GCI, 1990) mechanism. These studies do not distinguish between ETS 
and non-ETS sectors, either, which is a major cost driver in our study. 
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Figure 3: Summary of the welfare effects (= relative changes in total consumption = measure for 
mitigation costs) of the different climate policy scenarios for the EU-27 in 2040; 1. Reference is 
measured with respect to Business as Usual without any climate policy; all other scenarios (2. to 7.) 
are measured with respect to 1. Reference 
 
4.2. Technological Options 
 
Moreover, we do not differentiate between different kinds of renewable energies such as biomass, 
wind and solar that can expand to different extents.  Herein, we model renewable energies as they 
were available in 2004/2005 and let them expand over time. We abstract from the costs of capacity 
building though, which would require a forward-looking model type. We do not consider carbon 
capture and storage (CCS), large-scale solar or any other backstop breakthrough (backstop) 
technology, either. The use of such technologies might substantially reduce mitigation costs. 
However, the market-based realization of such technologies is currently highly uncertain. There are 
severe caveats regarding CCS and nuclear power in society, and large-scale solar projects are 
questionable for economic, political and technical reasons. It seems currently rather unclear at which 
costs CCS would work – carbon capture at low costs appears, nevertheless, possible. The 
uncertainties concerning CCS use in industries appear even higher than concerning CCS use in 
electricity generation. Thus, we refer to conservative data based on the technologies available in 
2004. These technologies can then endogenously expand or go down over time due to economic 
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progress and climate policy. Notwithstanding, we assess the impact of a larger availability of 
renewable energies and the availability of CCS on our results in a robustness check:  
 First, we keep our model of electricity generation based on the 2004 data but increase the 
supply elasticity of renewable energies from 2025 on until it reaches three instead of one by 2050. 
This represents a higher flexibility in the energy system and a political and technical environment 
that supports a further expansion of renewable energies. It results in an expansion of renewables in 
electricity generation to 50% instead of 40% in 2040 and to 63% instead of 51% in 2050 in the 
Fragmented Action scenario. The EU ETS CO2 price falls to 72€/t instead of 94€/t in 2040 and 104€/t 
instead of 144€/t in 2050. However, the stronger expansion of renewables comes at a cost. As a 
result, the negative welfare effect of the Roadmap climate policy falls only by between 0.1 and 0.3 
percentage points. Obviously, the benefit of a further expansion of renewables becomes smaller 
relative to its costs. Similarly, the negative welfare effect of Global Action National with international 
emissions trading could be reduced by 0.3 percentage points in 2050 via the expansion of 
renewables. Yet, this positive effect vanishes in earlier periods in this scenario. Presumably, there is 
less room for cost reductions left since there have already been no additional costs compared to the 
Reference scenario in this most cost efficient scenario. 
 Second, we additionally allow for CCS use in electricity generation by implementing CCS in a 
stylized straight-forward way: 90% of the emissions of burning fossil fuels (mainly coal and gas since 
oil plays a very minor role in future electricity generation in the model) are assumed to vanish due to 
sequestration. At the same time, the costs of fossil electricity generation are assumed to rise by 
roughly 20% following Paltsev et al. (2005). Moreover, we assume for simplicity that renewable 
energies are subject to a cost reduction of the same magnitude as the cost increase of fossil 
electricity generation due to CCS. This cost reduction for renewables may stem from stronger 
learning effects over time. As a result, we find on the one hand that coal use as a share in electricity 
generation is almost sustained – falling to only 22% at the end of the time horizon. Gas use is 
expanded to almost 24% in 2050, while it rather phased out in our standard fragmented Action 
scenario. We find on the other hand that the share of renewables now increases only weakly – 
reaching almost 27% in 2050. This means, the expansion of renewables is replaced by the 
deployment of fossil CCS technologies. As a result, the EU ETS CO2 price drops quasi to zero accept in 
late periods with drastic emissions targets. This is however not true for the marginal abatement costs 
in non-ETS sectors, they stay high. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that the cost reduction 
through CCS in combination with cheaper and more flexible renewables is limited: The reduction of 
the negative welfare effect of the Roadmap policy in late periods is reduced by between 0.6 and 0.8 
percentage points under Fragmented Action, and by up to 0.4 percentage points under Global Action 
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National – the most cost effective scenario. Under the latter scenario there is again little room for 
additional cost reduction in earlier periods. 
 In summary, our robustness check yields observable, but relatively small additional cost 
reductions via extended technological options. This also alludes to an important characteristic of our 
model: The largest part of the emissions reductions is achieved via the reduction of energy use (by 
replacing energy inputs by other inputs – compare the resulting improvement in the energy intensity 
of GDP reported in Table 1) rather than the decarbonisation of energy supply. This is a difference to 
models with a flexible, high-resolution energy system that allows a strong decarbonisation of energy 
supply. 
As another caveat, we look at CO2 emissions only, not at other greenhouse gases. The 
reduction in other greenhouse gases opens new and cheaper reduction options via technologies and 
substitution options not taken into account in our model. 
And as any other numerical analysis, our assessment is subject to uncertainties in future 
economic development, in particular economic growth and technical progress. Against the backdrop 
of recent economic turmoil, lower future economic growth would result in lower mitigation costs. 
Stronger energy and emissions saving technical progress would reduce mitigation costs if it can be 
achieved in a cost-efficient way. Notably, we do not model endogenous (directed) technical progress, 
either (like for example Popp, 2004; Otto et al., 2008; Bosetti et al., 2008). Endogenous technical 
progress in combination with perfect foresight of economic agents could help anticipate the drastic 
emissions reductions in late periods and therefore shift some of the costs to earlier periods – for 
example, through early investment in advanced low-carbon technologies. Forward-looking behaviour 
in combination with a climate target (temperature increase or carbon budget) could also result in 
emissions targets that differ from those given by the Decarbonisation Roadmap that stem from other 
model simulations. 
Additionally, there are uncertainties in the choice of elasticities of substitution, for example, 
between fossil and non-fossil inputs in production and of energy supply from different technologies. 
Different elasticities of substitution can significantly change mitigation costs. The direction and 
magnitude of these effects are not clear-cut, though: On the one hand, a better possibility to 
substitute inputs enhances the possibility to replace fossil inputs in case of climate policy. On the 
other hand, it raises output in the Business as Usual scenario and thus enlarges the mitigation effort. 
Elasticities of substitution may also changes over time, becoming higher in the long-run than in the 
short-run, which is not taken into account in this study. Higher Armington elasticities will presumably 
result in stronger trade and leakage effects of climate policy. The existing uncertainties in Armington 
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elasticities might not only affect the magnitude of policy effects, but possibly even the sign (positive 
or negative; compare Saito, 2004). This is in particular relevant for sectoral effects. 
 
4.3. Sectoral Effects 
 
Our study provides a detailed sectoral analysis. This allows us to better understand the drivers of the 
macroeconomic results that we observe and to get a feeling of sectoral differences in the impacts of 
climate policy. Both appear essential for breaking down the macro level Decarbonisation Roadmap to 
sectoral roadmaps and to finally realize decarbonisation. This sectoral view has often been neglected 
in climate policy analysis. However, any detailed sectoral view also involves simplifications and 
uncertainties: For example, the sector ‘PPP’ comprises production of pulp and paper as well as 
printing, which have rather different energy intensities and will thus be differently affected by 
climate policy. The emissions in the ‘Cement’ sectors (CEM) consist to 50 to 70% of process emissions 
in reality. These emissions can thus not be reduced via pure input factor substitution. This is not 
taken into account in our model. Moreover, CGE models usually do not explicitly consider 
multinational enterprises, foreign direct investment (FDI) and international location decisions of 
firms. In the extreme case, production facilities might be completely closed down in Europe, and new 
facilities might be installed elsewhere. Suppose, for example, ‘Manufacturing of iron and steel’ (ISM) 
is more labour intensive and less capital intensive than ‘Further processing of iron and steel’ (ISP). 
Then there can be a higher risk of relocation for ISM facilities than for ISP facilities ex ante. More 
technically speaking, our model does not capture firm’s decision to deliver foreign markets via 
exports or FDI or to stay with the domestic market instead along the lines of the Melitz model.33 As a 
consequence, it probably underestimates firms’ international relocation. Nevertheless, the model 
does capture a reduction in production in Europe, an expansion of production abroad, and enhanced 
related imports to Europe. We measure such effects in form of leakage and competitiveness 
measures in our analysis. Finally, the standard assumption of perfect competition that we make is 
more or less realistic for different sectors. We can thus not report in how far climate policy impacts 
on profit margins and investments taken from profits. Nevertheless, we can identify changes in 
sectoral investment patterns and thus changes in the development of sectoral capital stocks. In this 
sense, sectoral decarbonisation roadmaps such as IEA (2010) can be a helpful complement to the EU 
Decarbonisation Roadmap regarding the sectoral realization of macro policy. They can take sectoral 
technological solutions into account that are relevant for energy and emissions reductions, which is 
                                                          
33 E.g. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). For a CGE implementation of the Melitz model see Balistreri et al. (2011). 
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only in a limited way possible in a top-down macro model. And for a successful realization of 
ambitious climate policy targets it appears useful if not inevitable to look deeper into strategies to 
implement them on a sectoral level or even on a firm level. 
 
4.4. Summary 
 
In summary, our model results become less robust the later the time periods under scrutiny. 
Additionally, they become less robust on the sectoral level than on the macro level.34 In this sense, it 
is not the main strength and purpose of such policy analyses to predict costs in absolute terms, but 
to highlight the different economic effects of alternative policy options in qualitative terms. 
Against this backdrop, we find that in case of no carbon pricing in certain countries, an 
extensive future use of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) could exploit the cheap mitigation 
options in these countries. It could in this way drastically reduce the marginal abatement costs in EU 
ETS and non-ETS sectors and the resulting CO2 price differential.  However, the assumption that 50% 
of each ETS and non-ETS reduction effort can stem from CDM appears optimistic. It is questionable 
whether such a CDM policy is politically feasible and technically and economically feasible regarding 
its transaction costs and given that it does not solve the global climate problem. And we do not 
model technology transfer associated with project-based CDM either. We understand CDM in the 
sense of ‘where’-flexibility, this means the reduction of emissions where it is cheapest, such as in 
developing countries. Technology transfer associated with CDM could create additional emissions 
reductions abroad. And the availability of cheap mitigation options abroad relies on the assumption 
that the developing countries do not exploit these options by themselves. Nonetheless, one can still 
expect significant positive effects of CDM in a more limited form than assumed in our scenario.  
Furthermore, the results show that Global Action will hardly benefit the EU in the absence of 
international emissions trading regarding its macroeconomic effects. Only the equalization of the 
CO2 price across EU ETS and non-ETS sectors as well as across countries within Global Action would 
drastically reduce the mitigation costs that show up in our model. Nonetheless, Global Action results 
in much lower emissions and thus lower climate change damages than Fragmented Action. Thus, 
while damages are neglected in our model, Global Action is clearly preferable compared to 
fragmented action in reality. Stern (2006), for example, estimates that damages due to climate 
change related extreme weather events could amount to between 0.5 and 1% of world GDP by the 
                                                          
34 Results for single sectors can react sensitively and also depend on the sectoral disaggregation. The sectoral 
uncertainties average out on the macro level to some extent.  
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middle of the century.35  These damages are not captured by our model simulations. Therefore, there 
will be additional costs under Fragmented Action compared to Global Action. Global Action is 
inevitable for reaching the 2° climate target or any other acceptable temperature target – 
independent of the realization of international emissions trading.36  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
We have carried out a detailed economic CGE analysis of the EU Decarbonisation Roadmap 2050 on a 
macroeconomic and on a sectoral level. We can basically learn three lessons: 
 (1) Technology: In comparison to other studies that implement more technological options 
such as CCS, extensive use of biomass or large-scale solar, we find higher mitigation costs in the case 
that technologies for electricity generation are restricted to those that are available today. Research 
and development and the wide use of advanced energy generation technologies as well as the use of 
energy-saving technologies in firms and households appear therefore inevitable. In particular when 
targeting emissions reductions of around 80% because our analysis indicates that mitigation costs 
can rise more than proportionately when reductions come close to 80%. 
 (2) Policy: Mitigation costs also depend strongly on the policy design. Fragmented action, or 
in other words unilateral European climate action without using CDM to attribute emission reduction 
elsewhere, can lead to relatively high mitigation costs. Global climate action in combination with 
emissions trading between all countries and all EU sectors could avoid these costs to a large extent. 
An extended form of CDM could be applied to countries that are not part of the coalition and help 
disburden the EU regarding decarbonisation costs. However, the avoidance of severe climate change 
damages requires global action. In this sense, as a feasible policy option, one could make use of CDM 
in (smaller) countries that are not part of the climate coalition, while the main emitters were within 
the climate coalition. To conclude, not only the formulation of emissions targets but also the design 
of an appropriate, detailed policy strategy with a global perspective to implement them appears 
crucial. 
 (3) Sectors: sectoral policy effects can significantly differ from each other and from the 
macroeconomic effects. It appears therefore important for the practical realization of the 
                                                          
35 For a comparison of estimates of climate change costs and damages see for example the Stern (2006) Review 
on Climate Change, in particular chapter 5. The Stern estimates have been very controversially discussed. 
36 Our analysis does not target at a constant global temperature target. It rather assumes the same emissions 
target for the EU independent of other countries’ climate efforts. Our analysis does not take climate damages 
stemming from higher global emissions into account, either. 
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Decarbonisation Roadmap to look deeper into the sector-specific challenges and technological 
solution options and the related investments. 
 These three aspects are interlinked. For example, technological solutions are necessary to 
achieve ambitious climate targets at acceptable costs from a global perspective. An appropriate 
climate policy design is necessary to transfer the benefits from global level to the EU macro level and 
further to the sectoral level. And sectoral strategies by firms in correspondence with policy makers 
can be helpful to avoid structural and technological lock-in effects that might create high costs in 
certain sectors. In this light, this study has shown directions for Europe to make decarbonisation 
reality in an efficient way. 
 With regard to future research, our analysis shows that the sectoral impacts of climate policy 
can substantially deviate from the macro effects, and they also differ depending on the sectoral 
indicator applied. Moreover, sectoral results are often less robust than macro results. Hence, it is 
worthwhile shifting the focus of (numerical) climate policy assessment more to the sectoral level. 
This may also include sectoral climate policy approaches such as sectoral emissions caps. 
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7. Supplementary Appendix 
 
7.1. Appendix M 
 
 
 
 
Figure M1: The main CES production structure for each sector and region. Inputs are written in capital 
letters, elasticities of substitution in lower case letters; Y = output, K = capital, L = labour, * the sector-
specific production factor natural resources additionally enters here, E = energy, M1..M24 = 
intermediates, N = non-electricity, Q = liquid, C = CO2 
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  kle-m kl-e m e kl n a1 a2 
OIL 0.848 0.250 0.082 0.500 0.334 0.500 4.200 2.100 
GAS 0.250 0.256 0.391 0.500 0.460 0.500 4.000 2.000 
MIN 0.729 0.553 0.309 0.500 0.139 0.500 2.347 1.836 
PPP 0.187 0.211 0.250 0.500 0.381 0.500 5.900 2.950 
FER 0.848 0.250 0.082 0.500 0.334 0.500 6.600 3.300 
ORG 0.848 0.250 0.082 0.500 0.334 0.500 6.600 3.300 
INO 0.848 0.250 0.082 0.500 0.334 0.500 6.600 3.300 
OCR 0.848 0.250 0.082 0.500 0.334 0.500 6.600 3.300 
CEM 0.306 0.411 0.191 0.500 0.358 0.500 5.800 2.900 
BRT 0.306 0.411 0.191 0.500 0.358 0.500 5.800 2.900 
ONM 0.306 0.411 0.191 0.500 0.358 0.500 5.800 2.900 
ISM 1.173 0.644 0.253 0.500 0.220 0.500 5.900 2.950 
ISP 1.173 0.644 0.253 0.500 0.220 0.500 5.900 2.950 
ALU 0.306 0.411 0.191 0.500 0.358 0.500 8.400 4.200 
ONF 0.306 0.411 0.191 0.500 0.358 0.500 8.400 4.200 
ELE - - - - - - - - 
COL 0.729 0.553 0.309 0.500 0.139 0.500 6.100 3.050 
CRU 0.729 0.553 0.309 0.500 0.139 0.500 10.400 5.200 
MCH 0.548 0.519 1.087 0.500 0.144 0.500 7.717 3.863 
FAW 0.329 0.395 0.250 0.500 0.382 0.500 5.289 2.647 
TWL 0.722 0.637 0.597 0.500 0.161 0.500 7.572 3.772 
TRN 0.352 0.281 0.331 0.500 0.310 0.500 3.800 1.900 
SER 0.492 0.320 0.250 0.500 0.264 0.500 3.803 1.908 
 
Table M1: Sectoral CES elasticities of substitution corresponding to Figure M1; additionally a1 
denotes the Armington elasticity between imported varieties and a2 between imported varieties and 
the domestic variety of each good 
 
 
This section lists the key model equations, i.e. it describes the model in a stylized way that highlights 
the principal structure. The model equations are written as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP) 
for each region (r) described in section 2.3 and each period (t). An MCP consists of zero-profit and 
market clearance conditions and a consumer’s budget condition. The model equations are implicitly 
programmed under GAMS/MSPGE.  p denotes a price, X denotes a pecuniary quantity. i or j denote 
a sector described in section 2.3. f denotes the production factors capital (K), labour (L) and natural 
fossil resources. 𝜃𝑓,𝑖𝐺  represents a set of taxes and subsidy rates on output and inputs. M indicates an 
Armington (intermediate) good. C is CO2 associated with fossil fuel inputs in fixed proportion. 𝜋 
denotes profits, CES a constant elasticity of substitution function with the elasticity written as an 
upper index, and LTF a Leontief function. 
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I. Zero-profit conditions: 
 
 
(Z1a) Goods (Y) production (in sectors i except ELE in EUR) with the notation explained below 
Figure M1:  
 
𝜋𝑖
𝑌 =  𝑝𝑖𝑌 − 𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑘𝑙𝑒−𝑚 � 𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑘𝑙−𝑒⌊  
𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑖
𝑒〈𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑖
𝑛{𝐿𝑇𝐹[𝐿𝑇𝐹(𝑝𝑂𝐼𝐿 ,𝑝𝐶),𝐿𝑇𝐹(𝑝𝐺𝐴𝑆,𝑝𝐶)], 𝐿𝑇𝐹(𝑝𝐶𝑂𝐿,𝑝𝐶)},𝑝𝐸𝐿𝐸〉,𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑘𝑙�𝑓�𝑝𝑓𝐹 ,𝑝𝑓,𝑖𝐹 � ⌋, 
𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑖
𝑚|𝑗�𝑝𝑗𝑀�  � �𝜃𝑓,𝑖𝐺 ≤ 0  ∀ (𝑟, 𝑡) 
 
 
 
(Z1b) Electricity generation (ELE) in Europe (EUR) including a specific input factor (M, ELE) and a 
fixed factor (F, ELE): 
 
 
𝜋ELE
𝑌 = 𝑝ELE − 𝐶𝐸𝑆ELE𝑓−𝑒𝑙𝑒�𝑝𝐹,ELE,𝐿𝑇𝐹�𝑝𝑗𝑀 ,𝑝𝐶 ,𝑝𝑀,ELE���𝜃𝑓,𝑖𝐺 ≤ 0  ∀ (EUR, 𝑡) 
 
 
(Z2) Armington aggregation (M) of imports from foreign regions (s), associated with a price for 
transportation (𝑝𝑠,𝑟,𝑖𝑇 ) and an elasticity of substitution (a1), and of domestic goods (a2): 
 
 
𝜋𝑖
𝑀 = 𝑝𝑖𝑀 − 𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑎2 �𝑝𝑖𝑌,𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑎1�𝑠�𝐿𝑇𝐹�𝑝𝑠,𝑖𝑌 ,𝑝𝑠,𝑟,𝑖𝑇 ��� �𝜃𝑓,𝑖𝐺 ≤ 0  ∀ (𝑟, 𝑡) 
 
 
(Z3) Utility (U) generation of the representative consumer in each region (r) follows the nest 
structure shown in Figure M1 excluding factor inputs, i.e. it combines an energy with a non-
energy input bundle: 
 
 
𝜋𝑈 = 𝑝𝑈 − 𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑢 �
𝑖
�𝑝𝑖
𝑌, � ≤ 0  ∀ (𝑟, 𝑡) 
 
 
 
 
II. Market clearance conditions: 
 
 
(M1)  Goods markets (domestic inputs, Armington exports and domestic consumption): 
 
 
�
𝜕𝜋𝑗
𝑌
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝑌 𝑋𝑗
𝑌
𝑗
+ �𝜕𝜋𝑠,𝑖𝑀
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝑌 𝑋𝑠,𝑖𝑀
𝑠
+ 𝜕𝜋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝑌 𝑋
𝑈 ≤ 𝑋𝑖
𝑌   ∀ (𝑟, 𝑡) 
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(M2)  Armington goods (M) markets: 
 
 
�
𝜕𝜋𝑗
𝑌
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝑀 𝑌𝑗 ≤ 𝑋𝑖
𝑀
𝑗
  ∀ (𝑟, 𝑡) 
  
 
(M3a)  Intratemporal utility condition referring to the consumer’s budget (B):37 
 
 
𝑋𝐵
𝑝𝑈
≤ 𝑋𝑈   ∀ (𝑟, 𝑡) 
 
 
(M3b)  Factor (F) markets (for mobile and immobile factors given regional factor endowments): 
 
 
�
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝑌
𝜕𝑝𝑓
𝐹 𝑌𝑖 + �𝑋𝑓,𝑖𝐹
𝑖
≤ 𝑋�𝑓
𝐹
𝑖
  ∀ (𝑟, 𝑡) 
 
 
 
 
III. Budget condition: 
 
 
(B1)  Consumers’ purchases and investments (I) must not exceed their factor income (from the 
sectorally mobile and immobile parts of factors including natural fossil resources) plus revenues 
from selling CO2 (C) allowances plus tax minus subsidy (Q) revenues as a function of given tax 
and subsidy rates, plus net financial inflows from abroad (D):  
 
 1 ∙ 𝑋𝐵 = �𝑝𝑖𝑌
𝑖
𝑋𝑖
𝑌 + 𝑝𝐼𝑋𝐼 ≤��𝑝𝑓,𝑖𝐹 𝑋𝑓,𝑖𝐹  + 𝑝𝑓𝐹(𝑋�𝑓𝐹 − 𝑋𝑓,𝑖𝐹 )�
𝑓
+ 𝑝𝐶 𝑋�𝐶 + 𝑋𝐺�𝜃𝑓,𝑖𝐺 � + 𝑝𝐷𝑋𝐷    ∀ (𝑟, 𝑡) 
  
                                                          
37 Compare Markusen’s tutorial, http://spot.colorado.edu/~markusen/teaching.html (accessed 12/2011). 
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7.2. Appendix O 
 
(Table O1 is intentionally left out since we do not study sectoral changes under the Reference scenario.) 
  2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
OIL 0.0 0.0 -1.8 -2.5 -7.2 -15.4 -21.1 -33.6 -46.2 -55.9 
GAS 0.0 0.0 -5.5 -7.6 -18.6 -20.1 -30.5 -51.4 -71.2 -75.0 
MIN 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.7 -0.8 
PPP 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 -1.5 -2.0 -2.6 
FER 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.5 -1.6 -2.3 -2.9 -5.2 -7.2 -8.7 
ORG 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 -1.3 -1.9 -2.5 -4.4 -6.1 -7.5 
INO 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 -1.5 -2.2 -2.8 -5.0 -6.8 -8.3 
OCR 0.0 0.0 -1.0 -1.4 -4.3 -4.8 -6.3 -11.3 -15.8 -18.8 
CEM 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -0.9 -1.2 -2.1 -2.8 -3.6 
BRT 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.6 -1.2 -1.5 -2.5 -3.2 -4.0 
ONM 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.7 -1.0 -1.2 -2.2 -2.8 -3.6 
ISM 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.6 -1.6 -2.0 -3.2 -3.9 -4.8 
ISP 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.4 -1.1 -1.8 -2.2 -3.5 -4.2 -5.1 
ALU 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.7 -1.6 -2.1 -2.7 -4.3 -5.0 -5.8 
ONF 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.7 -1.8 -2.0 -2.6 -4.2 -4.9 -5.7 
ELE 0.0 0.0 -1.5 -1.9 -3.6 -3.9 -3.8 -4.2 1.2 2.1 
COL 0.0 0.0 -2.0 -4.0 -12.7 -13.1 -20.0 -35.1 -48.3 -66.3 
CRU 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -2.1 -3.0 -4.4 -8.6 -14.3 -19.6 
MCH 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.9 1.2 1.4 
FAW 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.7 -0.8 -1.1 -2.1 -3.1 -3.8 
TWL 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.6 -0.9 
TRN 0.0 0.0 -1.1 -1.7 -5.2 -5.9 -7.8 -13.9 -19.5 -23.2 
SER 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 
 
 Table O2: Relative output changes between the Fragmented Action scenario and the 
Reference scenario in each year in EU-27 sectors in %  
  
45 
 
  2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
OIL 0.0 0.0 -1.8 -2.5 -7.2 6.4 6.8 3.9 3.1 6.3 
GAS 0.0 0.0 -5.5 -7.6 -18.6 -29.0 -42.1 -62.3 -74.6 -77.6 
MIN 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 
PPP 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.5 -0.7 -1.4 -2.0 -2.5 
FER 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.5 -1.6 -1.1 -1.6 -3.4 -5.2 -6.6 
ORG 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 -1.3 -0.7 -1.0 -2.5 -4.0 -5.2 
INO 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 -1.5 -1.0 -1.5 -3.3 -5.0 -6.4 
OCR 0.0 0.0 -1.0 -1.4 -4.3 -4.8 -6.4 -11.4 -15.8 -18.8 
CEM 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -0.1 -0.3 -0.8 -1.4 -2.0 
BRT 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.6 -0.1 -0.2 -0.8 -1.5 -2.0 
ONM 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.7 -0.6 -0.8 -1.5 -2.2 -2.8 
ISM 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.6 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.3 
ISP 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.4 -1.1 -0.3 -0.5 -1.0 -1.2 -1.6 
ALU 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.7 -1.6 -1.3 -1.8 -3.0 -3.0 -3.4 
ONF 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.7 -1.8 -1.9 -2.5 -3.9 -4.2 -4.9 
ELE 0.0 0.0 -1.5 -1.9 -3.6 -5.9 -5.8 -5.3 0.8 2.0 
COL 0.0 0.0 -2.0 -4.0 -12.7 -19.8 -28.2 -45.8 -76.9 -98.3 
CRU 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -2.1 -2.3 -3.6 -7.5 -12.2 -16.3 
MCH 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.6 1.0 1.4 1.8 
FAW 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.7 -0.9 -1.2 -2.3 -3.4 -4.2 
TWL 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.6 -0.9 -1.2 
TRN 0.0 0.0 -1.1 -1.7 -5.2 -5.8 -7.7 -13.9 -19.5 -23.3 
SER 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -0.7 
 
 Table O3: Relative output changes between the Fragmented Action Free scenario and the 
Reference scenario in each year in EU-27 sectors in %  
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  2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
OIL 5.5 5.7 0.8 0.2 7.6 16.5 15.9 9.5 2.4 -1.5 
GAS 6.2 2.9 4.3 5.1 14.1 18.5 17.9 10.7 3.1 -0.8 
MIN 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 
PPP 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 
FER 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.3 1.2 1.9 1.7 1.1 0.4 0.0 
ORG 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.9 1.5 1.4 1.0 0.4 0.1 
INO 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.3 1.1 1.7 1.6 1.0 0.4 0.1 
OCR 1.2 1.1 0.3 0.1 3.5 4.7 3.8 1.9 0.0 -1.0 
CEM 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.2 
BRT 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.3 
ONM 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.3 
ISM 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.3 1.0 1.2 1.2 0.9 0.8 
ISP 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.4 0.5 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.0 0.9 
ALU 0.7 1.1 1.4 2.0 0.7 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.4 
ONF 0.7 1.0 1.5 2.1 0.8 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.3 
ELE 0.3 0.9 3.8 5.3 1.6 2.1 2.5 2.2 1.2 0.8 
COL 1.2 2.1 3.6 7.9 7.3 9.3 13.1 11.6 9.0 7.0 
CRU 0.7 0.5 -0.1 -0.3 1.6 2.6 2.2 1.0 -0.2 -1.0 
MCH -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.1 
FAW 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.0 -0.1 
TWL -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
TRN 1.4 1.2 0.1 -0.2 4.4 5.9 4.7 2.2 -0.2 -1.4 
SER 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
 Table O4: Relative output changes between the Fragmented Action CDM scenario and the 
Reference scenario in each year in EU-27 sectors in %  
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  2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
OIL 0.0 0.0 -1.8 -2.5 -6.7 -14.7 -20.2 -31.4 -44.7 -54.1 
GAS 0.0 0.0 -5.5 -7.6 -19.4 -22.2 -36.3 -59.8 -82.4 -92.5 
MIN 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.6 -0.8 -1.1 
PPP 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 -1.6 -2.3 -2.9 
FER 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.5 -1.1 -1.1 -0.4 -0.3 0.3 2.9 
ORG 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.9 -0.9 -0.3 -0.1 1.0 4.2 
INO 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 -1.2 -1.3 -1.0 -1.5 -1.3 0.8 
OCR 0.0 0.0 -1.0 -1.4 -3.9 -3.6 -3.9 -6.7 -8.6 -7.1 
CEM 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -0.8 -1.0 -1.8 -2.4 -2.6 
BRT 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.6 -1.1 -1.3 -2.3 -3.0 -3.3 
ONM 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.6 -0.7 -0.6 -1.2 -1.5 -1.3 
ISM 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -1.2 -1.2 -1.9 -2.4 -2.8 
ISP 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.4 -0.7 -0.8 -0.2 0.1 0.8 2.1 
ALU 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.7 -1.5 -1.6 -1.7 -2.9 -3.7 -4.3 
ONF 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.7 -1.6 -1.5 -1.6 -2.9 -3.8 -4.4 
ELE 0.0 0.0 -1.5 -1.9 -3.6 -3.5 -3.1 -4.3 2.5 5.7 
COL 0.0 0.0 -2.0 -4.0 -16.4 -22.6 -43.2 -70.0 -75.5 -83.0 
CRU 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -2.4 -4.1 -7.8 -16.6 -31.6 -55.4 
MCH 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -1.3 -2.7 
FAW 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.7 -0.9 -1.4 -2.7 -4.2 -5.4 
TWL 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -1.0 -1.5 -2.2 
TRN 0.0 0.0 -1.1 -1.7 -5.1 -5.6 -7.1 -12.4 -17.3 -19.3 
SER 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -0.8 -1.1 
 
Table O5: Relative output changes between the Global Action scenario and the Reference scenario in 
each year in EU-27 sectors in % 
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  2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
OIL -6.6 -2.4 -13.4 -14.9 -14.9 -1.6 -7.4 -18.2 -38.4 -48.9 
GAS 19.1 4.8 8.1 11.0 2.0 0.7 -17.8 -38.9 -63.6 -82.4 
MIN 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.7 -1.0 
PPP -0.3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -0.8 -0.9 -1.3 -2.1 -2.7 -3.3 
FER -0.3 -0.1 -1.2 -1.5 -1.8 -0.3 0.2 0.3 -1.1 -0.5 
ORG -0.7 -0.2 -1.4 -1.8 -2.2 -0.8 -0.5 -0.6 -1.9 -1.1 
INO -0.4 -0.1 -1.2 -1.5 -2.0 -0.7 -0.7 -1.3 -3.0 -2.8 
OCR 3.2 1.2 0.7 1.6 1.9 4.0 3.7 2.9 0.7 1.9 
CEM -0.8 -0.3 -1.2 -1.6 -2.2 -1.8 -2.0 -3.1 -4.7 -6.0 
BRT -1.2 -0.5 -1.5 -2.0 -2.8 -2.4 -2.7 -4.1 -6.0 -7.3 
ONM -1.1 -0.4 -1.2 -1.5 -2.1 -1.9 -2.0 -2.9 -4.5 -5.6 
ISM -2.7 -1.0 -3.3 -4.5 -5.9 -4.8 -5.2 -6.7 -8.4 -10.1 
ISP -3.3 -1.2 -3.4 -4.5 -6.0 -5.1 -5.1 -5.7 -6.3 -7.0 
ALU -3.8 -1.5 -3.7 -5.3 -7.6 -7.8 -8.8 -11.2 -11.2 -12.3 
ONF -3.4 -1.3 -3.1 -4.5 -6.7 -7.1 -8.2 -10.5 -10.6 -11.7 
ELE -3.1 -1.3 -3.3 -6.8 -9.8 -13.5 -9.4 -7.0 4.5 6.4 
COL -1.7 -2.0 -3.1 -9.0 -33.4 -65.4 -70.8 -98.6 -99.5 -99.8 
CRU 1.3 0.4 0.1 0.8 1.2 2.2 0.0 -4.8 -14.9 -33.0 
MCH -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.8 -1.2 -1.9 -2.5 -4.0 
FAW 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 -0.3 -1.3 -2.7 -3.9 
TWL 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.6 -1.1 -1.5 -2.1 
TRN 4.2 1.5 1.0 2.3 2.6 4.9 3.9 1.4 -4.1 -6.4 
SER 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -0.7 -0.9 
 
Table O6: Relative output changes between the Global Action National scenario and the Reference 
scenario in each year in EU-27 sectors in % 
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  2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
OIL 0.0 0.0 -1.8 -2.5 16.2 33.6 29.1 15.3 -2.0 -22.3 
GAS 0.0 0.0 -5.5 -7.6 31.3 32.6 28.4 7.4 -39.6 -73.4 
MIN 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.5 
PPP 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.5 0.6 0.5 -0.1 -1.4 -2.3 
FER 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.5 2.3 4.3 4.8 5.4 5.0 5.4 
ORG 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 1.8 3.4 3.9 4.5 4.3 5.2 
INO 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 2.1 3.6 3.6 3.6 2.6 2.5 
OCR 0.0 0.0 -1.0 -1.4 6.8 9.2 9.0 8.9 7.7 8.8 
CEM 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.8 1.4 1.3 0.7 -0.9 -2.6 
BRT 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 1.0 1.6 1.3 0.4 -1.6 -3.6 
ONM 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.2 -0.3 -1.7 
ISM 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 1.2 2.7 2.7 1.9 -1.4 -3.9 
ISP 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.4 1.9 3.2 3.8 3.9 1.4 0.3 
ALU 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.7 2.9 3.5 3.7 2.1 -3.6 -5.6 
ONF 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.7 3.1 3.6 3.9 2.6 -2.7 -4.5 
ELE 0.0 0.0 -1.5 -1.9 6.2 4.7 3.2 -2.1 -0.1 4.1 
COL 0.0 0.0 -2.0 -4.0 25.0 5.9 -7.6 -40.3 -84.5 -99.5 
CRU 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 3.0 4.1 3.0 -0.6 -7.6 -22.3 
MCH 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -1.2 -2.6 
FAW 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.9 0.9 0.5 -0.3 -1.7 -3.2 
TWL 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -1.6 
TRN 0.0 0.0 -1.1 -1.7 8.2 10.7 9.3 7.5 4.8 2.8 
SER 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.6 -1.0 
 
Table O7: Relative output changes between the Global Action International scenario and the 
Reference scenario in each year in EU-27 sectors in % 
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7.3. Appendix I 
 
(Table I1 is intentionally left out since we do not study sectoral changes under the Reference scenario.) 
  2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
OIL 0.0 0.0 -2.9 -3.8 -10.2 -19.8 -26.8 -41.5 -54.9 -65.4 
GAS 0.0 0.0 -6.8 -9.8 -27.0 -28.7 -40.7 -67.2 -84.3 -88.8 
MIN 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.8 2.7 3.3 
PPP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 
FER 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.4 -1.1 -1.9 -2.4 -3.8 -4.5 -5.6 
ORG 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -1.1 -1.3 -2.1 -2.1 -2.7 
INO 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.9 -1.7 -2.1 -3.3 -3.8 -4.8 
OCR 0.0 0.0 -1.2 -1.8 -5.6 -6.4 -8.6 -15.6 -22.1 -26.9 
CEM 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.0 
BRT 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.2 
ONM 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 
ISM 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 -0.2 -0.1 0.4 1.5 2.0 
ISP 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.6 1.9 2.6 
ALU 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 -0.5 -0.9 -1.1 -1.4 -1.2 -1.2 
ONF 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.8 -0.9 -1.0 -1.4 -1.2 -1.3 
ELE - - - - - - - - - - 
COL 0.0 0.0 -2.3 -4.4 -13.7 -13.9 -20.6 -35.6 -48.7 -66.6 
CRU 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -1.0 -4.2 -5.8 -8.4 -17.2 -27.4 -37.0 
MCH 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4 1.1 1.3 1.7 3.0 4.2 5.2 
FAW 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 
TWL 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 1.0 1.2 1.5 2.6 3.6 4.4 
TRN 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -1.0 -3.1 -3.5 -4.4 -7.8 -10.7 -12.6 
SER 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.4 
 
Table I2: Relative capital stock changes between the Fragmented Action scenario and the Reference 
scenario in each year in EU-27 sectors in % 
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  2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
OIL 0.0 0.0 -2.9 -3.8 -10.2 5.1 4.9 0.0 -5.3 -6.0 
GAS 0.0 0.0 -6.8 -9.8 -27.0 -39.5 -53.2 -76.6 -86.6 -90.3 
MIN 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.8 2.6 3.3 
PPP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -0.6 
FER 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.4 -1.1 0.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.9 -1.6 
ORG 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.2 
INO 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.9 0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.5 -1.0 
OCR 0.0 0.0 -1.2 -1.8 -5.6 -6.6 -8.8 -16.0 -22.4 -27.2 
CEM 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.9 1.0 1.5 2.1 2.4 
BRT 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.6 1.3 1.6 2.3 3.0 3.5 
ONM 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 
ISM 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 1.9 2.3 3.8 5.6 6.8 
ISP 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 1.1 1.5 2.9 4.8 6.1 
ALU 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 -0.5 0.1 0.0 0.1 1.1 1.6 
ONF 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.8 -0.7 -0.8 -1.1 -0.4 -0.2 
ELE - - - - - - - - - - 
COL 0.0 0.0 -2.3 -4.4 -13.7 -20.8 -28.9 -46.3 -77.1 -98.3 
CRU 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -1.0 -4.2 -4.5 -6.9 -15.2 -23.9 -32.0 
MCH 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4 1.1 1.3 1.7 3.1 4.5 5.5 
FAW 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 
TWL 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 1.0 1.0 1.4 2.4 3.4 4.1 
TRN 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -1.0 -3.1 -3.4 -4.4 -7.7 -10.7 -12.6 
SER 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.8 1.1 1.3 
 
Table I3: Relative capital stock changes between the Fragmented Action Free scenario and the 
Reference scenario in each year in EU-27 sectors in %38 
  
                                                          
38 Some results, for instance for GAS and COL, appear extreme and need to be taken with caution.  
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  2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
OIL 6.9 7.6 3.4 3.6 9.8 21.1 21.6 14.4 6.0 1.8 
GAS 6.5 4.2 5.7 6.9 24.9 33.0 31.2 20.4 5.8 -1.6 
MIN -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -0.6 -0.5 -0.3 -0.1 0.1 
PPP 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
FER 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.2 0.5 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.3 
ORG 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.1 
INO 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.1 0.3 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 
OCR 1.5 1.4 0.4 0.1 4.7 6.4 5.2 2.7 -0.1 -1.5 
CEM -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 
BRT -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 
ONM 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 
ISM 0.2 0.5 0.6 1.0 -0.6 -0.3 0.1 0.7 1.1 1.4 
ISP 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.5 -0.5 -0.4 0.1 0.6 1.0 1.3 
ALU 0.4 0.8 1.0 1.4 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.9 0.9 1.0 
ONF 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.6 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.0 
ELE - - - - - - - - - - 
COL 1.5 2.6 4.3 9.0 8.2 10.2 14.1 12.2 9.4 7.2 
CRU 0.9 0.9 -0.2 -0.5 3.5 5.5 4.7 2.4 -0.6 -2.4 
MCH -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.8 -1.1 -0.9 -0.4 0.0 0.2 
FAW -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
TWL -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.7 -1.0 -0.8 -0.5 0.0 0.2 
TRN 0.9 0.8 0.1 -0.2 2.6 3.4 2.6 1.2 -0.1 -0.8 
SER -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 0.1 
 
Table I4: Relative capital stock changes between the Fragmented Action CDM scenario and the 
Reference scenario in each year in EU-27 sectors in % 
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  2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
OIL 0.0 0.0 -2.9 -3.8 -10.3 -21.2 -31.3 -49.2 -67.0 -81.5 
GAS 0.0 0.0 -6.8 -9.8 -27.9 -31.3 -47.2 -74.6 -91.4 -97.5 
MIN 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.9 2.8 3.4 
PPP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 -0.7 -0.9 
FER 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 0.7 2.5 6.0 12.4 
ORG 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.1 1.3 3.6 7.6 14.6 
INO 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.7 0.2 1.4 4.4 10.3 
OCR 0.0 0.0 -1.2 -1.8 -5.2 -5.2 -6.0 -11.0 -15.1 -15.5 
CEM 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.3 1.5 
BRT 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.4 0.6 1.0 1.4 1.7 
ONM 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.6 2.1 
ISM 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.3 1.0 2.4 4.4 6.1 
ISP 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.6 1.0 2.4 5.3 9.0 13.0 
ALU 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.8 
ONF 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 0.2 0.5 
ELE - - - - - - - - - - 
COL 0.0 0.0 -2.3 -4.4 -17.5 -23.7 -43.9 -70.4 -75.7 -83.1 
CRU 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -1.0 -4.7 -7.8 -14.0 -29.9 -49.7 -73.3 
MCH 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.6 2.0 1.2 
FAW 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 -1.0 
TWL 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.9 1.0 1.2 2.2 3.1 3.5 
TRN 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -1.0 -3.0 -3.1 -3.5 -5.9 -7.8 -7.4 
SER 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.0 
 
Table I5: Relative capital stock changes between the Global Action scenario and the Reference 
scenario in each year in EU-27 sectors in %39 
  
                                                          
39 Some results, for instance for OIL, GAS, COL and CRU, appear extreme and need to be taken with caution. 
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  2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
OIL -12.3 -4.7 -18.1 -21.9 -26.0 -16.6 -29.0 -50.7 -78.5 -92.0 
GAS 20.7 7.1 10.8 15.6 3.2 1.1 -25.3 -54.6 -78.8 -92.9 
MIN -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.3 1.0 1.9 2.7 
PPP -0.3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -1.2 -1.3 -1.5 
FER -2.6 -1.0 -2.8 -4.2 -5.9 -5.3 -5.2 -6.7 -11.2 -13.9 
ORG -2.6 -0.9 -2.6 -3.8 -5.2 -4.5 -4.2 -4.8 -7.5 -8.2 
INO -2.6 -1.0 -2.7 -4.0 -5.9 -5.5 -5.7 -7.6 -12.0 -14.7 
OCR 4.1 1.6 1.1 2.2 2.6 5.2 4.7 2.9 -1.0 -1.2 
CEM -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.5 -0.3 0.2 0.5 1.1 2.0 2.7 
BRT 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.7 -0.3 0.4 0.8 1.5 2.6 3.5 
ONM -0.6 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.4 0.0 0.3 0.7 1.2 
ISM -3.6 -1.3 -3.4 -4.8 -6.4 -6.1 -6.2 -7.0 -7.5 -8.3 
ISP -3.9 -1.5 -3.3 -4.7 -6.1 -5.7 -5.2 -4.6 -3.1 -2.0 
ALU -3.3 -1.3 -3.1 -4.4 -5.9 -5.7 -6.1 -7.0 -6.0 -6.1 
ONF -3.0 -1.2 -2.6 -3.7 -5.1 -5.3 -5.7 -6.7 -5.9 -6.1 
ELE - - - - - - - - - - 
COL -2.1 -2.4 -3.6 -9.9 -34.8 -66.2 -71.3 -98.7 -99.5 -99.8 
CRU 1.6 0.7 0.1 1.4 2.6 4.6 -0.1 -10.2 -28.3 -53.4 
MCH -0.7 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.6 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4 -1.1 
FAW -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.8 -1.2 
TWL -0.4 -0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.2 1.1 1.6 
TRN 2.8 1.0 0.7 1.5 1.8 3.2 2.9 2.1 -0.1 0.1 
SER -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.3 0.4 
 
Table I6: Relative capital stock changes between the Global Action National scenario and the 
Reference scenario in each year in EU-27 sectors in %40 
 
  
                                                          
40 Some results, for instance for OIL, GAS, COL and CRU, appear extreme and need to be taken with caution.  
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  2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
OIL 0.0 0.0 -2.9 -3.8 25.2 44.1 33.0 0.8 -41.1 -78.0 
GAS 0.0 0.0 -6.8 -9.8 62.5 64.3 52.8 13.7 -56.6 -87.8 
MIN 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.9 -1.1 -0.9 -0.4 0.4 1.3 
PPP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.9 -1.3 
FER 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.4 1.5 3.2 3.7 3.8 1.4 -1.5 
ORG 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 0.5 1.8 2.4 3.0 2.2 1.7 
INO 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 1.3 2.4 2.5 2.0 -0.7 -3.6 
OCR 0.0 0.0 -1.2 -1.8 9.1 12.3 12.0 11.3 8.9 8.8 
CEM 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.7 -0.2 0.1 0.5 1.2 2.1 
BRT 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 -1.1 -0.4 -0.1 0.5 1.5 2.7 
ONM 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.4 0.9 1.2 1.8 
ISM 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.6 1.0 0.8 -1.6 -3.2 
ISP 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.8 1.9 3.1 2.4 3.3 
ALU 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 1.3 2.0 2.5 2.1 -0.9 -1.1 
ONF 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 1.7 2.1 2.7 2.5 -0.3 -0.5 
ELE - - - - - - - - - - 
COL 0.0 0.0 -2.3 -4.4 29.2 6.5 -8.0 -40.9 -84.6 -99.5 
CRU 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -1.0 6.7 9.0 6.3 -1.3 -15.9 -40.6 
MCH 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4 -1.3 -1.7 -1.4 -0.9 -0.6 -1.1 
FAW 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -1.1 -1.5 -2.0 
TWL 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 -1.4 -1.8 -1.5 -0.8 -0.1 0.2 
TRN 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -1.0 4.8 6.2 5.5 5.0 4.4 4.8 
SER 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4 -0.4 
 
Table I7: Relative capital stock changes between the Global Action International scenario and the 
Reference scenario in each year in EU-27 sectors in %41 
 
 
  
                                                          
41 Some results, for instance for OIL, GAS, COL and CRU, appear extreme and need to be taken with caution.  
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7.4. Appendix E 
 
(Table E1 is intentionally left out since we do not study sectoral changes under the Reference scenario.) 
  2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
OIL 0.0 -12.1 -21.0 -29.5 -37.7 -58.3 -66.7 -76.8 -83.5 -88.8 
GAS 0.0 10.1 -3.0 -12.3 -32.8 -35.6 -46.8 -71.7 -86.0 -90.2 
MIN 0.0 1.5 -9.2 -19.9 -32.9 -43.8 -52.2 -64.9 -75.9 -83.2 
PPP 0.0 -8.4 -13.9 -15.6 -15.3 -16.7 -21.5 -26.3 -31.5 -39.2 
FER 0.0 -12.4 -16.0 -17.1 -17.3 -21.7 -26.6 -33.3 -38.4 -44.6 
ORG 0.0 -12.5 -15.3 -16.0 -15.7 -19.7 -24.3 -30.2 -35.0 -40.9 
INO 0.0 -12.5 -16.0 -17.1 -17.2 -21.4 -26.2 -32.8 -37.8 -43.9 
OCR 0.0 2.4 -6.9 -16.7 -28.9 -38.2 -45.2 -57.3 -68.3 -76.0 
CEM 0.0 -12.1 -20.2 -23.5 -25.2 -29.0 -35.0 -42.5 -48.2 -54.9 
BRT 0.0 -13.0 -25.2 -29.7 -32.1 -36.6 -43.7 -52.2 -58.3 -64.9 
ONM 0.0 -11.4 -17.7 -20.5 -21.8 -24.9 -30.3 -36.9 -42.0 -48.8 
ISM 0.0 -13.9 -23.2 -26.9 -28.4 -34.9 -42.4 -51.8 -57.7 -64.5 
ISP 0.0 -13.1 -16.4 -18.2 -18.0 -23.5 -28.9 -35.6 -39.8 -46.3 
ALU 0.0 -12.0 -20.9 -24.3 -25.4 -29.2 -35.8 -43.9 -49.6 -56.7 
ONF 0.0 -9.5 -13.9 -15.3 -14.6 -17.3 -22.5 -28.9 -34.0 -41.4 
ELE 0.0 -9.3 -13.9 -21.2 -28.6 -27.5 -41.8 -61.7 -78.0 -86.1 
COL 0.0 -9.1 -18.4 -30.2 -38.6 -42.0 -54.0 -66.2 -76.0 -85.1 
CRU 0.0 -14.1 -12.8 -14.9 -20.2 -23.6 -26.3 -34.9 -43.4 -51.9 
MCH 0.0 16.4 -2.5 -18.8 -35.0 -46.2 -55.6 -68.1 -78.8 -85.5 
FAW 0.0 5.5 -6.9 -18.6 -31.4 -41.5 -49.8 -61.7 -72.8 -80.3 
TWL 0.0 18.5 -2.7 -20.6 -38.3 -49.8 -59.4 -72.2 -82.2 -88.3 
TRN 0.0 -1.7 -4.4 -10.2 -19.1 -27.4 -33.9 -45.6 -57.0 -65.4 
SER 0.0 6.4 -10.2 -21.7 -35.9 -46.5 -54.9 -66.2 -76.8 -83.6 
 
Table E2: Relative emission changes vis-à-vis 2005 in each year under the Fragmented Action scenario 
in EU-27 sectors in % 
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  2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
OIL 0.0 -12.1 -21.0 -29.5 -37.7 -44.9 -51.4 -58.9 -64.8 -68.7 
GAS 0.0 10.1 -3.0 -12.3 -32.8 -45.3 -58.0 -79.8 -88.0 -91.5 
MIN 0.0 1.5 -9.2 -19.9 -32.9 -44.1 -52.6 -65.3 -76.3 -83.5 
PPP 0.0 -8.4 -13.9 -15.6 -15.3 -17.7 -22.5 -27.0 -37.6 -44.4 
FER 0.0 -12.4 -16.0 -17.1 -17.3 -18.8 -22.6 -27.4 -34.1 -39.4 
ORG 0.0 -12.5 -15.3 -16.0 -15.7 -16.7 -20.2 -24.2 -30.4 -35.3 
INO 0.0 -12.5 -16.0 -17.1 -17.2 -18.6 -22.4 -27.0 -33.6 -38.9 
OCR 0.0 2.4 -6.9 -16.7 -28.9 -38.4 -45.4 -57.5 -68.5 -76.1 
CEM 0.0 -12.1 -20.2 -23.5 -25.2 -28.5 -34.1 -40.5 -48.6 -54.6 
BRT 0.0 -13.0 -25.2 -29.7 -32.1 -36.8 -43.6 -51.2 -59.8 -65.8 
ONM 0.0 -11.4 -17.7 -20.5 -21.8 -24.5 -29.4 -34.9 -42.6 -48.3 
ISM 0.0 -13.9 -23.2 -26.9 -28.4 -32.4 -39.1 -47.0 -55.1 -61.3 
ISP 0.0 -13.1 -16.4 -18.2 -18.0 -19.4 -23.5 -27.7 -33.3 -38.2 
ALU 0.0 -12.0 -20.9 -24.3 -25.4 -29.0 -35.3 -42.4 -51.2 -57.4 
ONF 0.0 -9.5 -13.9 -15.3 -14.6 -16.6 -21.3 -26.8 -35.4 -41.7 
ELE 0.0 -9.3 -13.9 -21.2 -28.6 -34.8 -50.2 -71.7 -88.0 -97.0 
COL 0.0 -9.1 -18.4 -30.2 -38.6 -46.6 -58.9 -71.8 -89.3 -99.2 
CRU 0.0 -14.1 -12.8 -14.9 -20.2 -22.6 -25.1 -33.3 -40.7 -48.1 
MCH 0.0 16.4 -2.5 -18.8 -35.0 -48.2 -57.6 -69.7 -79.8 -86.1 
FAW 0.0 5.5 -6.9 -18.6 -31.4 -42.3 -50.6 -62.4 -73.4 -80.7 
TWL 0.0 18.5 -2.7 -20.6 -38.3 -52.1 -61.6 -74.0 -83.4 -89.0 
TRN 0.0 -1.7 -4.4 -10.2 -19.1 -27.2 -33.7 -45.6 -57.1 -65.5 
SER 0.0 6.4 -10.2 -21.7 -35.9 -47.6 -56.1 -67.1 -77.5 -84.0 
 
Table E3: Relative emission changes vis-à-vis 2005 in each year under the Fragmented Action Free 
scenario in EU-27 sectors in % 
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  2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
OIL 9.2 -2.7 -10.1 -18.0 -17.6 -30.3 -37.4 -46.9 -53.4 -58.4 
GAS 6.5 14.7 10.0 4.0 14.9 20.3 17.8 3.9 -5.3 -13.7 
MIN 4.5 6.1 -4.4 -15.1 -2.6 -8.3 -14.0 -22.3 -30.5 -36.6 
PPP 2.1 -6.5 -7.8 -8.4 -8.4 -8.4 -11.2 -14.3 -17.2 -19.2 
FER 2.1 -10.3 -11.1 -11.1 -11.6 -12.8 -15.9 -19.9 -23.4 -26.2 
ORG 1.7 -10.7 -11.0 -10.8 -11.3 -12.3 -15.2 -18.8 -22.1 -24.8 
INO 2.0 -10.5 -11.2 -11.2 -11.7 -12.9 -16.0 -19.9 -23.3 -26.1 
OCR 4.4 7.2 -2.6 -12.6 0.0 -4.6 -9.5 -16.7 -23.9 -29.3 
CEM 3.1 -8.8 -12.4 -14.4 -16.5 -17.8 -22.0 -27.2 -31.3 -34.5 
BRT 4.9 -8.1 -14.6 -17.7 -20.5 -22.4 -27.6 -34.2 -39.0 -42.9 
ONM 2.4 -8.8 -11.1 -12.6 -14.3 -15.2 -18.8 -23.4 -27.0 -29.9 
ISM 4.0 -9.5 -13.3 -15.0 -18.2 -20.8 -25.7 -32.3 -36.9 -40.6 
ISP 2.2 -10.5 -10.6 -10.7 -12.8 -14.7 -17.9 -22.3 -25.6 -28.1 
ALU 3.6 -8.1 -11.6 -13.2 -15.4 -16.7 -20.8 -26.2 -30.2 -33.2 
ONF 2.1 -7.4 -7.8 -7.6 -7.8 -8.1 -10.8 -14.3 -17.3 -19.4 
ELE 2.4 -6.2 -4.4 -5.2 -9.4 -6.5 -13.0 -21.0 -28.8 -32.8 
COL 1.5 -6.8 -12.9 -20.4 -23.0 -25.7 -33.9 -41.1 -48.8 -52.2 
CRU 0.9 -13.4 -12.5 -14.5 -13.7 -14.5 -15.8 -19.5 -22.5 -25.6 
MCH 6.1 24.6 5.2 -12.3 8.3 1.1 -6.9 -17.9 -28.6 -36.2 
FAW 4.5 11.1 -2.0 -14.3 -0.1 -5.7 -11.8 -20.0 -28.5 -34.6 
TWL 6.8 27.7 6.3 -12.7 8.9 1.1 -7.5 -19.6 -30.9 -38.8 
TRN 3.1 1.0 -1.5 -7.0 2.6 -0.8 -4.5 -10.3 -16.1 -20.7 
SER 4.9 12.4 -5.4 -17.9 -1.6 -8.3 -15.5 -24.6 -33.9 -40.7 
 
Table E4: Relative emission changes vis-à-vis 2005 in each year under the Fragmented Action CDM 
scenario in EU-27 sectors in % 
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  2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
OIL 0.0 -12.1 -21.0 -29.5 -37.7 -59.2 -68.9 -79.8 -87.6 -93.4 
GAS 0.0 10.1 -3.0 -12.3 -33.7 -37.9 -52.6 -78.1 -92.3 -97.8 
MIN 0.0 1.5 -9.2 -19.9 -33.0 -44.0 -52.8 -65.7 -76.9 -83.9 
PPP 0.0 -8.4 -13.9 -15.6 -15.4 -16.6 -21.1 -25.6 -29.1 -30.5 
FER 0.0 -12.4 -16.0 -17.1 -16.9 -20.6 -24.0 -27.8 -28.4 -24.3 
ORG 0.0 -12.5 -15.3 -16.0 -15.3 -18.6 -21.7 -24.8 -24.8 -19.7 
INO 0.0 -12.5 -16.0 -17.1 -16.9 -20.5 -24.2 -28.3 -29.2 -25.5 
OCR 0.0 2.4 -6.9 -16.7 -28.6 -37.5 -44.1 -55.5 -66.2 -72.7 
CEM 0.0 -12.1 -20.2 -23.5 -25.2 -28.9 -34.7 -41.6 -45.7 -47.5 
BRT 0.0 -13.0 -25.2 -29.7 -32.3 -37.0 -44.5 -53.0 -58.2 -61.6 
ONM 0.0 -11.4 -17.7 -20.5 -21.7 -24.3 -28.8 -34.1 -36.9 -37.0 
ISM 0.0 -13.9 -23.2 -26.9 -28.3 -34.6 -41.5 -49.8 -53.8 -54.8 
ISP 0.0 -13.1 -16.4 -18.2 -17.3 -21.5 -24.1 -26.1 -24.1 -15.9 
ALU 0.0 -12.0 -20.9 -24.3 -25.3 -28.9 -35.1 -42.6 -46.9 -49.0 
ONF 0.0 -9.5 -13.9 -15.3 -14.3 -16.2 -20.1 -25.0 -27.4 -26.6 
ELE 0.0 -9.3 -13.9 -21.2 -28.6 -27.2 -40.9 -60.7 -77.0 -85.6 
COL 0.0 -9.1 -18.4 -30.2 -41.3 -48.6 -67.5 -84.5 -88.6 -92.5 
CRU 0.0 -14.1 -12.8 -14.9 -20.7 -25.3 -30.8 -44.9 -60.8 -79.7 
MCH 0.0 16.4 -2.5 -18.8 -35.3 -46.8 -56.6 -69.7 -80.5 -86.9 
FAW 0.0 5.5 -6.9 -18.6 -31.6 -41.9 -50.6 -62.9 -74.1 -81.3 
TWL 0.0 18.5 -2.7 -20.6 -38.5 -50.2 -60.2 -73.5 -83.5 -89.3 
TRN 0.0 -1.7 -4.4 -10.2 -19.1 -27.3 -33.7 -45.1 -56.4 -64.0 
SER 0.0 6.4 -10.2 -21.7 -36.0 -46.8 -55.6 -67.3 -77.9 -84.3 
 
Table E5: Relative emission changes vis-à-vis 2005 in each year under the Global Action scenario in 
EU-27 sectors in % 
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  2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
OIL -20.5 -19.5 -35.8 -46.2 -53.1 -61.0 -71.4 -83.6 -94.6 -98.5 
GAS 20.7 17.9 15.3 12.5 -5.0 -8.6 -33.0 -60.8 -81.0 -93.8 
MIN 17.8 9.0 1.9 -3.2 -7.2 -12.4 -20.2 -33.2 -54.2 -67.1 
PPP -11.4 -12.7 -17.2 -20.5 -21.6 -25.3 -31.0 -42.6 -65.8 -76.9 
FER -10.1 -15.9 -21.1 -24.9 -27.7 -30.9 -35.9 -45.1 -61.2 -70.5 
ORG -9.6 -15.8 -20.3 -23.6 -25.9 -28.8 -33.4 -42.0 -57.8 -66.8 
INO -10.0 -15.9 -21.0 -24.8 -27.6 -30.9 -36.1 -45.4 -61.4 -70.6 
OCR 19.7 11.2 6.1 2.1 -0.4 -3.4 -8.5 -18.8 -39.3 -50.4 
CEM -14.1 -17.2 -25.0 -30.8 -34.9 -39.9 -46.6 -57.3 -72.8 -81.3 
BRT -19.0 -19.8 -30.5 -37.7 -42.9 -48.9 -56.6 -67.1 -80.6 -87.5 
ONM -12.0 -15.8 -22.1 -27.2 -30.6 -34.8 -40.6 -50.9 -67.7 -76.7 
ISM -19.4 -20.7 -31.6 -39.4 -45.2 -51.4 -59.0 -70.1 -82.7 -89.2 
ISP -13.0 -17.7 -24.1 -29.6 -33.0 -36.9 -41.5 -51.0 -66.2 -74.6 
ALU -17.3 -18.2 -27.3 -33.9 -38.1 -43.4 -50.5 -62.0 -77.3 -85.2 
ONF -11.8 -13.9 -19.6 -23.8 -25.8 -29.7 -35.6 -47.4 -66.4 -76.6 
ELE - - - - - - - - - - 
COL -2.1 -11.3 -19.5 -34.2 -53.6 -77.2 -83.4 -99.3 -99.8 -99.9 
CRU 1.6 -13.5 -12.2 -12.8 -14.5 -15.2 -19.6 -29.4 -44.1 -64.4 
MCH 34.5 33.3 24.3 16.8 12.6 4.1 -7.6 -28.3 -57.8 -72.8 
FAW 24.1 17.0 10.2 5.0 1.5 -4.0 -12.3 -26.9 -51.1 -64.7 
TWL 36.1 36.4 25.2 15.9 10.1 0.2 -12.8 -34.7 -62.6 -76.7 
TRN 10.2 1.9 1.0 -0.5 -1.8 -3.9 -8.2 -15.9 -32.0 -42.7 
SER 30.2 20.3 11.5 9.3 6.5 0.6 -7.9 -23.8 -53.3 -68.1 
 
Table E6: Relative emission changes vis-à-vis 2005 in each year under the Global Action National 
scenario in EU-27 sectors in %  
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  2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
OIL 0.0 -12.1 -21.0 -29.5 5.0 -11.6 -31.1 -56.6 -79.0 -94.1 
GAS 0.0 10.1 -3.0 -12.3 49.5 48.5 37.2 -1.9 -61.2 -89.3 
MIN 0.0 1.5 -9.2 -19.9 19.9 17.0 9.3 -2.6 -20.9 -42.3 
PPP 0.0 -8.4 -13.9 -15.6 -1.4 -3.5 -9.9 -18.5 -33.6 -58.1 
FER 0.0 -12.4 -16.0 -17.1 -5.6 -7.5 -13.1 -21.7 -35.1 -51.1 
ORG 0.0 -12.5 -15.3 -16.0 -6.4 -8.0 -12.9 -20.3 -32.2 -47.1 
INO 0.0 -12.5 -16.0 -17.1 -6.0 -8.2 -14.0 -22.9 -36.2 -51.9 
OCR 0.0 2.4 -6.9 -16.7 22.8 21.8 16.8 9.3 -4.3 -22.7 
CEM 0.0 -12.1 -20.2 -23.5 -4.7 -10.8 -20.3 -33.3 -49.9 -67.2 
BRT 0.0 -13.0 -25.2 -29.7 -2.5 -13.2 -26.8 -44.0 -61.8 -77.1 
ONM 0.0 -11.4 -17.7 -20.5 -5.1 -9.0 -16.4 -26.4 -41.4 -60.0 
ISM 0.0 -13.9 -23.2 -26.9 -4.2 -12.1 -23.5 -40.4 -60.7 -77.0 
ISP 0.0 -13.1 -16.4 -18.2 -6.9 -8.6 -13.4 -20.1 -33.6 -52.2 
ALU 0.0 -12.0 -20.9 -24.3 -2.8 -8.5 -18.0 -32.3 -51.9 -70.7 
ONF 0.0 -9.5 -13.9 -15.3 -1.9 -2.5 -6.8 -14.9 -32.5 -55.3 
ELE 0.0 -9.3 -13.9 -21.2 5.9 1.9 -10.5 -38.5 -90.3 -39.5 
COL 0.0 -9.1 -18.4 -30.2 -8.0 -28.3 -46.7 -69.0 -92.8 -99.8 
CRU 0.0 -14.1 -12.8 -14.9 -11.1 -11.7 -14.5 -22.4 -34.4 -54.7 
MCH 0.0 16.4 -2.5 -18.8 54.1 50.6 41.0 22.9 -10.4 -47.4 
FAW 0.0 5.5 -6.9 -18.6 30.4 26.5 17.7 4.6 -15.8 -41.1 
TWL 0.0 18.5 -2.7 -20.6 59.7 55.0 43.9 22.2 -15.6 -52.8 
TRN 0.0 -1.7 -4.4 -10.2 13.5 12.8 8.6 2.8 -6.3 -18.8 
SER 0.0 6.4 -10.2 -21.7 32.2 29.3 21.3 9.7 -11.6 -42.8 
 
Table E7: Relative emission changes vis-à-vis 2005 in each year under the Global Action International 
scenario in EU-27 sectors in % 
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7.5. Appendix C 
 
(Table C1 is intentionally left out since we do not study sectoral changes under the Reference scenario.) 
  2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
OIL 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 1.4 -8.8 -11.5 -17.5 -23.3 -28.4 
GAS 0.0 0.0 -2.7 -4.3 -10.2 -11.7 -18.8 -28.5 -40.1 -43.4 
MIN 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.8 1.0 1.3 2.4 3.4 4.2 
PPP 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.9 2.7 3.3 
FER 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -1.3 -1.5 -2.4 -2.8 -3.6 
ORG 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.9 -1.0 -1.6 -1.9 -2.4 
INO 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.8 -1.0 -1.5 -1.6 -2.1 
OCR 0.0 0.0 -0.8 -1.2 -3.5 -3.8 -4.9 -8.8 -12.3 -14.6 
CEM 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.9 -0.2 0.0 0.6 1.8 2.1 
BRT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 -1.2 -1.1 -1.1 -0.4 -0.3 
ONM 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.5 1.0 1.8 2.1 
ISM 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -1.2 -1.3 -1.6 -1.3 -1.3 
ISP 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 0.4 0.7 
ALU 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.7 -1.4 -1.9 -2.3 -3.4 -3.3 -3.5 
ONF 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.7 -1.6 -1.6 -2.0 -3.0 -3.0 -3.2 
ELE 0.0 0.0 -4.0 -5.3 -12.2 -12.0 -16.5 -27.9 -32.4 -36.3 
COL 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -2.0 -7.8 -9.4 -16.8 -32.5 -47.4 -64.5 
CRU 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 3.0 3.9 5.6 6.3 5.6 
MCH 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4 1.3 1.6 2.1 3.8 5.4 6.6 
FAW 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.7 1.3 1.9 2.4 
TWL 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4 1.1 1.5 1.9 3.4 4.8 5.9 
TRN 0.0 0.0 -1.7 -2.6 -8.0 -8.9 -11.3 -19.7 -27.2 -31.9 
SER 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 1.3 1.6 2.0 3.6 5.0 5.9 
 
Table C2: Competitiveness changes between the Fragmented Action scenario and the Reference 
scenario in each year in EU-27 sectors in % 
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  2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
OIL 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 1.4 23.3 31.7 47.4 67.4 86.7 
GAS 0.0 0.0 -2.7 -4.3 -10.2 -16.5 -25.9 -33.5 -46.2 -48.6 
MIN 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.8 0.8 1.0 2.0 2.7 3.3 
PPP 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.8 1.4 2.1 2.5 
FER 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.2 0.8 
ORG 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.1 
INO 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.2 0.9 
OCR 0.0 0.0 -0.8 -1.2 -3.5 -4.1 -5.4 -9.4 -13.0 -15.4 
CEM 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.9 3.1 3.6 5.3 6.6 7.3 
BRT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 3.3 3.7 5.1 5.9 6.5 
ONM 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.6 1.2 1.6 1.9 
ISM 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 1.8 2.0 2.9 4.0 4.6 
ISP 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.6 1.1 1.8 2.2 
ALU 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.7 -1.4 -1.0 -1.4 -2.2 -1.4 -1.3 
ONF 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.7 -1.6 -1.8 -2.3 -3.3 -2.9 -3.1 
ELE 0.0 0.0 -4.0 -5.3 -12.2 -17.7 -23.7 -37.6 -40.2 -45.3 
COL 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -2.0 -7.8 -14.0 -23.5 -42.2 -70.9 -90.1 
CRU 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 -6.3 -8.1 -11.7 -18.3 -25.3 
MCH 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4 1.3 1.4 1.8 3.4 5.0 6.1 
FAW 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2 
TWL 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4 1.1 1.0 1.3 2.6 3.9 4.8 
TRN 0.0 0.0 -1.7 -2.6 -8.0 -9.0 -11.5 -20.2 -27.9 -32.7 
SER 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 1.3 1.3 1.7 3.0 4.2 5.0 
 
Table C3: Competitiveness changes between the Fragmented Action Free scenario and the Reference 
scenario in each year in EU-27 sectors in %42 
 
  
                                                          
42 The results for OIL, GAS, COL and CRU in late periods appear to be outliers. Obviously, a very strong switch 
from coal and gas to oil occurs due to the free allocation of allowances for refined oil and coal products. 
Nonetheless, the relative changes say nothing about the competitiveness index in absolute terms. In absolute 
terms, the competitiveness index is very low for CRU, COL and GAS, for instance, under Reference as well as 
Fragmented Action Free. In this sense, the tables show in some cases strong changes in relative terms, but 
small changes in absolute terms. 
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  2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
OIL 3.3 3.9 -0.5 -1.2 0.6 7.6 8.0 5.7 3.0 1.7 
GAS 5.1 0.7 0.4 0.0 5.7 8.0 6.8 2.0 -2.0 -4.2 
MIN -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.7 -0.9 -0.8 -0.5 -0.1 0.1 
PPP -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.1 -0.6 -0.8 -0.7 -0.3 0.1 0.3 
FER 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 
ORG 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 
INO 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 -0.1 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 
OCR 1.1 0.9 0.2 0.0 2.8 3.7 2.9 1.4 -0.1 -0.8 
CEM 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.8 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.2 
BRT 0.6 1.0 0.8 1.2 -0.6 0.2 0.6 1.1 1.3 1.6 
ONM 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.5 -0.4 -0.5 -0.3 0.0 0.3 0.5 
ISM 0.6 1.0 0.7 1.1 -0.1 0.5 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.2 
ISP 0.2 0.4 0.6 1.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.8 
ALU 0.8 1.3 1.8 2.5 0.4 0.8 1.3 1.6 1.6 1.8 
ONF 0.7 1.1 1.8 2.6 0.5 0.6 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.7 
ELE 3.1 4.5 8.7 12.8 5.0 6.0 8.3 9.2 8.4 9.1 
COL 0.6 0.4 0.8 2.2 3.4 5.5 8.5 7.9 6.0 4.3 
CRU -1.5 -1.7 0.7 1.1 -1.4 -3.5 -3.3 -1.9 -0.3 0.7 
MCH -0.4 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -1.0 -1.4 -1.1 -0.6 0.0 0.2 
FAW -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 
TWL -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.8 -1.2 -1.0 -0.5 -0.1 0.1 
TRN 2.3 1.9 0.0 -0.6 6.7 8.8 6.6 2.9 -0.5 -2.1 
SER -0.4 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -1.0 -1.4 -1.2 -0.7 -0.1 0.1 
 
Table C4: Competitiveness changes between the Fragmented Action CDM scenario and the Reference 
scenario in each year in EU-27 sectors in % 
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  2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
OIL 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 2.9 -6.2 -6.1 -7.0 -8.5 -6.1 
GAS 0.0 0.0 -2.7 -4.3 -9.2 -9.8 -16.0 -25.8 -40.7 -63.1 
MIN 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.2 -0.1 -1.5 
PPP 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.0 
FER 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 1.3 2.7 7.2 15.1 23.3 33.6 
ORG 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.6 1.3 3.3 7.1 12.4 20.1 
INO 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.8 1.4 3.5 7.2 12.4 20.0 
OCR 0.0 0.0 -0.8 -1.2 -3.0 -2.3 -1.9 -2.8 -2.5 1.5 
CEM 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 1.1 3.5 7.9 14.1 21.7 33.0 
BRT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 -0.6 0.1 0.6 3.4 10.3 
ONM 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.8 1.3 2.2 3.4 4.5 
ISM 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.6 0.8 2.8 5.2 7.7 10.1 
ISP 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.7 1.7 3.7 6.0 8.0 
ALU 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.7 -1.1 -1.0 -0.7 -0.8 -0.3 0.2 
ONF 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.7 -1.4 -0.9 -0.8 -1.4 -1.2 -0.9 
ELE 0.0 0.0 -4.0 -5.3 -10.2 -5.3 -2.0 1.5 13.9 36.7 
COL 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -2.0 -14.0 -4.4 30.1 55.2 83.1 99.4 
CRU 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.8 0.4 -3.6 -12.1 -25.3 -49.6 
MCH 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4 1.0 0.6 -0.1 -0.5 -1.6 -4.9 
FAW 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.7 -1.5 -2.5 -4.0 
TWL 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.9 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.6 -0.3 
TRN 0.0 0.0 -1.7 -2.6 -7.7 -8.0 -8.8 -14.4 -18.4 -16.6 
SER 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 1.0 0.4 -0.5 -1.4 -3.0 -7.0 
 
Table C5: Competitiveness changes between the Global Action scenario and the Reference scenario in 
each year in EU-27 sectors in %43 
  
                                                          
43 The results for GAS, FER, ELE and COL appear as outliers. The results show a very strong switch towards coal 
that probably overestimates the real effects. Nonetheless, the relative changes say nothing about the 
competitiveness index in absolute terms. In absolute terms, the competitiveness index is very low for CRU, COL 
and GAS, for instance, under Reference as well as Global Action. In this sense, the table shows strong changes 
in small values. 
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  2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
OIL -10.8 -4.0 -17.3 -21.6 -22.0 -9.2 -10.0 -13.0 -22.9 -20.6 
GAS 15.0 1.6 4.6 8.5 11.0 15.8 20.7 32.2 25.0 -15.7 
MIN -0.4 -0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.8 -1.2 -1.6 -3.1 
PPP -0.6 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -1.3 -1.6 -2.2 -2.0 -2.4 
FER -3.1 -1.1 -3.4 -4.4 -4.0 -0.8 3.0 8.9 12.2 18.1 
ORG -1.9 -0.6 -2.1 -2.7 -2.6 -0.8 0.8 3.3 5.0 9.5 
INO -2.7 -1.0 -2.7 -3.6 -3.8 -1.9 -0.3 1.8 3.0 7.2 
OCR 3.2 1.2 1.0 1.9 2.5 4.3 4.7 5.3 5.4 8.9 
CEM -5.4 -2.1 -5.4 -6.9 -8.4 -4.1 -0.5 2.3 4.2 10.0 
BRT -6.4 -2.6 -6.8 -8.8 -11.2 -9.0 -8.9 -11.4 -13.9 -11.3 
ONM -1.7 -0.7 -1.2 -1.6 -2.0 -2.1 -1.8 -1.9 -2.4 -2.6 
ISM -4.1 -1.5 -4.6 -6.0 -7.2 -5.0 -3.7 -3.0 -2.6 -2.3 
ISP -2.5 -0.9 -2.2 -3.0 -3.8 -3.4 -2.9 -2.1 -0.9 -0.4 
ALU -4.9 -1.9 -4.6 -6.5 -9.0 -9.3 -10.2 -12.3 -10.9 -11.1 
ONF -4.3 -1.7 -3.7 -5.4 -7.9 -8.6 -9.7 -12.0 -11.0 -11.4 
ELE -11.8 -4.8 -11.8 -20.3 -30.9 -35.7 -38.8 -40.8 -8.7 22.1 
COL -1.5 0.0 -0.9 -3.7 -23.9 -44.4 -17.0 -76.6 -77.0 -73.3 
CRU 1.9 0.6 5.5 6.1 4.4 -2.9 -5.2 -10.3 -15.9 -28.8 
MCH -0.7 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -1.3 -2.1 -3.2 -4.3 -7.6 
FAW 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.5 -0.2 -0.9 -1.9 -2.9 -4.5 
TWL -0.2 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.6 -0.4 -1.1 -1.6 -1.3 -2.3 
TRN 7.7 2.7 2.2 4.4 5.6 9.4 8.7 7.3 2.3 3.5 
SER -0.4 -0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 -1.0 -1.8 -3.0 -4.5 -8.2 
 
Table C6: Competitiveness changes between the Global Action National scenario and the Reference 
scenario in each year in EU-27 sectors in %44 
  
                                                          
44 The results for COL in late periods appear to be outliers. See the caveats below the previous tables. 
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  2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
OIL 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 1.2 17.7 17.6 14.1 10.7 7.6 
GAS 0.0 0.0 -2.7 -4.3 4.3 5.1 2.4 -1.1 7.8 -21.0 
MIN 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 -1.2 -2.0 -2.3 -3.1 -3.9 -5.6 
PPP 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 -1.1 -1.9 -2.2 -3.2 -4.5 -5.8 
FER 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 4.8 8.7 14.2 19.1 25.0 
ORG 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 1.7 3.0 5.0 7.6 12.3 
INO 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 1.2 2.2 3.3 4.7 8.1 
OCR 0.0 0.0 -0.8 -1.2 5.1 6.9 6.9 6.9 7.3 10.3 
CEM 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.0 5.5 10.2 16.1 18.7 21.0 
BRT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 2.4 4.2 6.5 5.5 3.4 
ONM 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.5 -0.7 -0.3 -0.5 -1.1 -2.2 
ISM 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 1.0 3.2 4.1 4.5 3.1 3.6 
ISP 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.1 0.3 0.5 
ALU 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.7 2.7 3.1 3.4 1.1 -4.9 -5.4 
ONF 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.7 2.9 3.1 3.6 1.6 -4.2 -5.0 
ELE 0.0 0.0 -4.0 -5.3 16.1 15.5 19.5 13.4 -8.0 14.7 
COL 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -2.0 3.7 17.7 65.2 125.4 92.8 -42.1 
CRU 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 -2.0 -8.2 -9.8 -13.0 -18.4 -28.8 
MCH 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4 -1.5 -2.6 -2.8 -3.6 -5.0 -8.3 
FAW 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.4 -1.4 -2.1 -3.5 -5.2 -7.4 
TWL 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4 -1.2 -2.2 -2.1 -1.9 -2.1 -3.3 
TRN 0.0 0.0 -1.7 -2.6 12.2 16.2 14.7 13.9 13.9 17.1 
SER 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 -1.9 -3.2 -3.9 -5.2 -6.7 -10.2 
 
Table C7: Competitiveness changes between the Global Action International scenario and the 
Reference scenario in each year in EU-27 sectors in %45 
 
                                                          
45 The COL in late periods are an obvious outlier to be taken with caution. See the caveats below the previous 
tables. 
